Voting Rights: A Case Study of
Madison Parish, Louisianat
During the past decade Congress recognized that the fifteenth amendment had not succeeded in securing the franchise for all citizens. In the
South, particularly, state-enforced registration laws prevented the majority of blacks from participating in the electoral process. To remedy
this situation, national legislation reaffirmed the right to vote and forged
methods of federal enforcement of that right. Although the initial Civil
Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 provided necessary predicates for relief
from discrimination, they did not terminate the need for county-bycounty litigation. Accordingly, Congress designed the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 to transfer enforcement from the courthouse to the registrar's office through utilization of administrative remedies. This shift
from a litigative to an administrative approach soon achieved impressive levels of black registration. However, the recalcitrance of registrars
and local officials persisted. Discriminatory practices reemerged in attempts to prevent free exercise of the franchise through manipulation
of electoral procedures. Consequently, the tedious litigation which preceded the Act did not abate; judicial intervention was still required to
force compliance with fifteenth amendment guarantees.
This comment will attempt to trace the development and effects of
voting rights litigation in Madison Parish, Louisiana, a black belt community which has experienced four major voting rights suits in the past
ten years. Following a brief description of the parish, the discussion will
focus on the emergence of private party and government suits, the implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the new discriminatory
practices in the exercise of the franchise, and the concomitant effects
on Madison Parish politics. It is hoped that this case study will, therefore, not only capture the flavor of voting rights litigation but also
t This study was performed under a research grant from the American Bar Foundation. The analyses, conclusions, and opinions expressed are those of the authors, however,
and not those of the Foundation, its officers and directors, or others associated with its
work.
During the course of research, extensive interviews were conducted with residents and
local officials in Madison Parish and with attorneys and other participants in voting
rights litigation. When requested, the identity of the person interviewed has been withheld to preserve anonymity.
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suggest the policy considerations which should underly future efforts
to secure the right to cast an effective ballot.
I.

THE SETrING

Madison Parish, whose eastern border meets the Mississippi River,
is situated in the Delta country of northeast Louisiana.' The tracks of
the Illinois Central and the Missouri Railroads divide the parish seat,
Tallulah, 2 both physically and racially-to the west the residences and
business are black-owned and -occupied, to the east they are white.
There is no municipal park, no municipal swimming pool, no indoor
movie theater, no bowling alley, no municipal transportation system,
no functioning hospital. An outdoor movie theater, the only public
recreational facility in Tallulah, is located in the white section of
town; the private Tallulah Country Club provides members with a
nine-hole golf course.
Traditionally, the parish has been a plantation society3 with a black
majority population. 4 Farming5 still provides the area's economic base,
I The parish, with a land area of 662 square miles, was organized by the Louisiana
legislature in 1838 and named after President Madison. For a written history of Madison
Parish, see the undocumented essay by a Tallulah attorney, Murphy, The History of Madison Parish,Louisiana, 11 LA. HIsT. Q. 39 (1928).
2 The original parish seat, Richmond, was destroyed during the Civil War. Tallulah,
founded in 1857, has a romantic origin much cherished by its residents. A railroad construction engineer fell captive to the charm of a rich widow who convinced him to build
the railroad across her land. Once the line was completed, the widow's romantic interest
waned. The disillusioned engineer named the station he established Tallulah, in commemoration of his lost love.
3 The Mississippi Delta area, in northeast Louisiana ...
remains a plantation sodety. There are plantation owners in Tensas and Madison parishes who take pride
in the resemblance between the plantations of 1856 and 1956, in terms of the physical appearance of the Negro and his cabin, and of the social and economic relationships between Negro and white.
The survival of this kind of power depends upon excluding the Negro from all
political and economic power.
Fenton & Vines, Negro Registration in Louisiana, 51 Am. POL. Sc. REv. 704, 708 (1957).
Compare the following 1899 description of the "peculiar conditions" in Madison Parish
which led to the lynching of six Italian immigrants in front of the courthouse:
It is the blackest district in the United States. In a population of 16,000 there are
only one hundred and sixty white families. There are twenty negroes to one
white, and in some sections they stand one hundred to one. Yet the entire power
is in the hands of the whites. They own all the land and other property. They
alone vote; they alone sit on juries. They elect all the officers and administer all
the affairs of the parish. Their administration is excellent ... But with so small
a white population in the midst of such an overwhelming majority of Negroes 'a
strong hand' has been deemed necessary to keep the latter in subjection ....
Walker, Tallulah's Shame, 43 HA .WE'sWVEEKLY 779 (1899).
4 Between 1880 and 1920, blacks comprised approximately 90.0% of the total population. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NEGRO POPULATION 1790-1915, at

782 (1918). In 1930 the figure dropped to 64.5%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COmMERCE, NEGROES IN THE UNrIED STATES 1920-32, at 742 (1935). The black-white popula-

tion ratio remained at 65:35 until 1970, when it dropped to 60:40.
5 Of 423,860 acres only 185,069 are under crop production. Figures available from Madi-
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primarily through extensive government subsidies. 6 Mechanization of

agriculture has resulted in consolidation, however, 7 and the majority of
residents now live in Tallulah."
A changing racial profile has accompanied this demographic shift.
Since 1940, white population has risen in city and parish alike, while
nonwhite population has increased in Tallulah but decreased in the
parish as a whole.9 In other words, a few rural blacks have migrated to
the city while a greater proportion have left the parish altogether.
Lack of industrial development helps explain this exodus.10 The only
source of large-scale employment in Tallulah itself is a lumber mill. 1
son Parish Assessor. The remaining acreage is forest land, 70% of which is owned by the
Chicago Mill and Lumber Co., which operates a plant in Tallulah.
6 In 1969, 112 farms received $1.7 million in grants and subsidies. Eighteen farms and
corporations received over $120,000 apiece in cotton surplus. The overall average subsidy
was $13,900, with one farm garnering $79,000. Interview with Carl Smith, Director, Delta
Community Action Association (funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity), in Tallulah, La., Oct. 30, 1970. Compare the fact that the Chicago Mill and Lumber Co. pays
no taxes to the city of Tallulah.
7 Between 1950 and 1959 the number of farms decreased from 1669 to 735 and the average size increased from 142.4 to 281.5 acres. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL, A STATISTICAL PROFILE oF MADISON PAISH 13 (June, 1965) (out of print; copy on file at The
University of Chicago Law Review [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL PROFILE].
8 In 1940, 69% of the parish's residents were settled in rural areas. 2 BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940, PoPuLATION pt. 3, at 363 (1943). By 1960, city dwellers were in the majority, with 57.2% of the
population. Additionally, of the 42.8% representing rural population, 17.2% are classified
as nonfarm. I BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EIGHTEENTH DECENNIAL
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960 pt. 20, at 10, 230 (1963).
9
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Total
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Nonwhite
Tallulah
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White
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Cent

Population
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Cent

Population
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Cent
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Per
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18,443
5,655
12,788

80.7
69.3

17,451
5,891
11,560

33.8
66.2

16,444
5,812
10,632

35.3
64.7

15,065
5,895
9,151

39.1
60.9

5,712
1,955
3,757

34.2
65.8

7,758
2,145
5,613

27.6
72.4

9,413
2,874
6,539

30.5
69.5

9,446
*
*

*

* 1970 figures not yet available.
Sources: 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

U.S. DEP'T OF COmmERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE

UNITED STATES: 1940, POPULATION pt. 3, at 363, 419 (1943); 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE SEVENTEENTH DECENNIAL CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950 pt. 18, at 24, 72 (1952); 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EIGHTEENTH DECENNIAL

CENSUS OF THE UNITED

STATES,

CENSUS OF

POPULATION: 1960 pt. 20, at 57, 82 (1963). The 1970 census figures are available from the
Bureau of the Census, United States Department of Commerce.
10 Between 1950 and 1964, the number of farms operated by blacks decreased from
1,058 to 152 while the number of white-owned farms increased from 611 to 368. STATISTICAL
PROFILE, supra note 7, at 13 (1950 figures); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF CommiaERCE,
CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: 1964, LOUISIANA 326-27 (1965) (1964 figures).
11 Although Madison Parish does not meet the 6% unemployed criterion for classifica-
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Welfare payments, therefore, support a substantial segment of the pop12
ulation, both black and white.
Madison Parish has always been a black majority community under
white control. 13 In 1884 the ratio of black to white voters was ten to
one, the highest of any parish in Louisiana.14 Blacks did not, however,
govern themselves, and following the post-Reconstruction era they were
disenfranchised. 15 For the next half century, the apparatus of state-suption as an area of substantial unemployment, the average estimate of those out of work
was 5.8% in 1967, 5.7% in 1968, and 4.7% in 1969. The hiring of additional workers at
boat plants in Delhi, Louisiana and Natchez, Mississippi caused the reported decrease in
1969 unemployment. LA. DEs'T or EMPLOYMENT, CIVILIAN WORK FORCE STUDY, AREA
MANPOWER REvmw 1967-1969. On August 7, 1967, on the basis of criteria other than
unemployment, Madison Parish was designated a redevelopment area under Title 4 of the
Public Works and Economic Development Act. Letter from William L. Gifford, Special
Assistant for Legislative Affairs, United States Department of Labor, to Senator Russell
Long, Aug. 7, 1967.
12 In 1959, of 3,619 families, 63.2% earned under $3,000 and 4.6% earned over $10,000.
The median annual income was $2,190. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DF'T OF COMMERCE,
COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 1967, at 153 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 DATA BOOK].

Comparative Louisiana state figures: 35.6% of the population earn less than $3,000 per
year, 9.9% earn more than $10,000; the median income for Louisiana is $4,272. Id. In
December, 1970, 1,092 families received food stamps for 5,271 individuals, amounting to
S120,885 in coupons. Madison Journal (La.), Jan. 28, 1971, at 3A. Aid to Dependent
Children funds reached 427 families, representing 1,695 children and amounting to payments of $38,829. LA. PuBuc WELFARE STATISTICS, REPORT ON APRIL, MAY AND JUNE
1970, at 10 (figures as of June 1970). Contributing to the dominance of welfare in the
Madison Parish economy are the age level and educational background of residents. The
percentage of citizens over 65 rose from 4.8% in 1940 to 7.7% in 1950 to 10.2% in 1960,
while the percentage of those 21 and over decreased from 59.5% in 1940 to 55.5% in 1950
to 51.7% in 1960. 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940, POPULATION pt. 3, at 372 (1943); 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE SEVENTEENTH DECENNIAL CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950 pt. 18, at 72 (1952); 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EIGITEENTH DECENNIAL CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, CENSUS OF

1960 pt. 20, at 82 (1963). Only 19.6% of the residents have completed high
school, and 36.8% have finished less than five years of school; 10.9% of the adults have
no schooling. 1967 DATA BOOK, supra, at 153. With a median school year completion level
of 6.7 grades for those 25 and over, id., Madison Parish ranks 54th of the 64 parishes.
STATISTICAL PROFILE, supra note 7, at 5.
Is Detloff & Jones, Race Relations in Louisiana 1877-98, 9 LA. HiST. 301, 309 (1968).
14 1886 LA. SEC'Y OF STATE ANN. REP.; 1884 LA. SEC'Y OF STATE STATEMENT, at 51-52
(1886).
15 See Walker, supra note 3. Carpetbag government existed in Louisiana until April,
1877. During the following twenty years, the Democratic Party secured its position by
buying black votes while running on a white supremacy ticket. The 1898 state constitution
established three alternative qualifications for electors: an educational requirement
which included demonstrating ability to read and write by filling out an application
form containing "traps for the unwary," a property requirement of $300 assessed value
and paid-up taxes, and a grandfather clause. LA. CONsT. art. 197, §§ 3-5 (1898). The grandfather clause was a substitute for the understanding clause, which had been condemned
as a fraud. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 372 nA6 (E.D. La. 1963), af'd, 380
U.S. 145 (1965). Judge Wisdom's scholarly opinion provides a concise historical overview
POPULATION:
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ported segregation insured that black citizens would be denied the right
to vote.16 The white primary served to prevent blacks from influencing
the nominating process and, following its invalidation' 7 the Louisiana
Constitution itself provided the means by which local officials deprived
all blacks of the franchise'8-under the "voucher requirement," all
prospective registrants were required to establish their identity to the
registrar's satisfaction."9 In Madison Parish, the registrar invariably demanded that black applicants obtain personal verification from two
registered voters. 20 Since all registered voters were white and no white
would "vouch" for a black, total disfranchisement on racial grounds
resulted.
World War II appears to have been an important catalyst in changing this system. Although segregation existed in the army, black men
trained with whites and were expected to perform similar jobs. Readjustment to Southern expectations of servility and self-deprecation was
difficult. 21 Moreover, an election for President had been held in 1944.
White soldiers could cast absentee ballots, but many black men could
not.
[I]t was a time when President Franklin D. Roosevelt was runin addition to a detailed study of statutory and discretionary discriminatory devices. See
also W.E.B. DuBois, BLAcK RECONSTRUCrION (1935); E. LONN, RECONSTRUCTION IN LOUISIANA
AFrra 1868 (1918); Fenton & Vines, supra note S.
16 When the Supreme Court invalidated the grandfather clause, Guinn v. United States,
238 U.S. 347 (1915), Louisiana's 1921 constitutional convention replaced it with an equally
odious practice. The interpretation test required voter applicants to be able to read and
write and to interpret the state and federal constitutions. LA. CONsT. art. 8, § 1(c) (1921). A
provision permitting registration if the applicant could "understand and give a reasonable
interpretation of any section of either Constitution when read to him by the registrar"
protected illiterate white voters against disenfranchisement. Id. at § l(d), repealed in
1960 by constitutional amendment, LA. CONsT. art. 8, § 1(c).
17 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see V.0. KEY, SoUTHERN PoLrmcs IN STATE
AND NATION 555, 576 (1949). For a discussion of alternative methods of disenfranchisement,
see M. PRICE, THE NEGRO AND THE BALLOT IN THE SOUTH (1959); Note, Use of Literacy Tests
to Restrict the Right to Vote, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 251 (1956).
Is Until 1962 no Madison Parish black was registered; as of 1956 only three other
parishes could report zero black registration. U.S. CoMa''N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT 567-69
(1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 CIvIL RIGHTs REPORT].
19 LA. CONST. art. 8, § l(c) (1921); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:37 (1969).
20 See United States v. Ward, 222 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 349 F.2d 795,
modified, 352 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1965). The voucher requirement was even more pernicious
than either the interpretation test or the selective purge. Although federal law did not
require officials to preserve records, cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1974 (Supp. V, 1965-69), some registrars
kept files of rejected applications, which enabled investigators to document technicalities
employed to disfranchise blacks. By contrast, when the voucher requirement was used
no black ever even filled out an application form and no documents existed to contradict
a registrar's avowal of nondiscriminatory practices.
21 See U.S. Comm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT 42 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 CIvl.
RIGHTS REPORT].
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ning for reelection. All of us black soldiers stood there and
felt like fools as we watched white soldiers going to cast their
absentee ballots for Roosevelt. You know all of us liked Roosevelt and, man, I wanted to vote so bad that it just hurt. But
they told me I couldn't vote because I wasn't a registered voter
in my hometown. Now here I was an American soldier way over
in Europe fighting for some white people's freedom and I
couldn't even vote for the president of my own country. That
hurt me bad. I said to myself right then that when I get back
to Tallulah [and Madison Parish] I was gonna start laying
the
22
groundwork for black people to get the right to vote.
This resolution gained strength from evidence that blacks throughout
the South were resisting discriminatory social patterns23 and from the
increased black registration in some areas following invalidation of the
24
white primary
In Madison Parish, returning veterans began their first attempts to
register during 1947. These individuals still reside in the parish and
provide the continuity of leadership which has been a major factor
in securing the black community's strong political position.2 5 Zelma C.
Wyche, the acknowledged leader of the parish's blacks, described the
nature of prelitigation history:
[In 1947] we drew up a petition with the names of the taxpayers in the town and presented it to the Mayor and the
Sheriff after an appointment had been made with them.
[T]hey said they would take it under consideration and notify us at a later date and this date was never given. We were
22 The statement is that of Village Marshal Zelma C. Wyche, quoted in Sanders, Black
Lawman in KKK Territory, EBONY, Jan., 1970, at 57, 60.
23 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (invalidating restrictive housing
covenants); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (invalidating local laws requiring
segregated seating in passenger carriers engaged in interstate travel).
24 It is estimated that in 1940 only 5% of voting-age blacks were registered to vote in
eleven Southern states. By 1947 the number increased to 12% and by 1952 to 20%.
M. PRicE, THE NEGRO VOTER IN THE SOUTH 1 (1957). In Louisiana, black registration in 1948
was only 3% but by 1952 it had reached 10.2% of the eligible adult blacks. Hearings
Before the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights 424 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Civil Rights
Hearings].
25 My primary reason for coming back to Madison Parish after World War II
was to do something about the situation that we were in in Madison Parish as
black people . . . . We were really under a bondage . . . . [Bllack people were
primarily slaves, I might say, because there was nothing constructive that black
people could do in Madison Parish that would help them. The only thing
that the white man wanted out of us was work for nothing or a little pay. After
that they were through with you. I knew I was going to stay in Madison Parish
the rest of my days and that was why I thought it was necessary to band ourselves
together to do something to help eradicate these conditions that we were in.
Interview with Zelma C. Wyche, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 29, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Wyche
Interview].
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asking for the privilege of registering and voting in Madison
Parish.
[After the meeting with the Mayor and the Sheriff] we went
to the Register office on the first occasion, we asked the Registrar if we could be registered at that time and she said, "Yes,
but you will have to have two electors who are on my books to
identify you."
And we asked if any Negroes were on the books and we were
told no. We said, are there any whites registered? And she said,
"Yes." We said, "who are some of them?" And she said, "practically all the white people in Madison Parish are registered."
"Would you give us some of the names?" We asked,-this
is on the first occasion-and she said, "quite a few are registered." Or, "All are registered." And we asked if we could
get some of the names and she said: "You might bump into
some of them on the streets any place." And we left the office.
[In 1951] we had a committee to go and try to register 26
[The Registrar] said, "You will have to have certain
identification." And I told her I had my driver's license
and also I had my tax receipts in my pocket, which I thought
were identification enough, and at that time I had my honorable discharge from the Army in a small pocketbook size and
I offered to show these but she said, "you still will have to
have someone who is on our books to identify you." She told
us we should see the Sheriff about registering, and we left the
office and went across the hall to the Sheriff's office. He wasn't
27
in on that particular date and we didn't see him.

Repeated frustration led black residents to retain the only black attorney in that part of the state, James Sharp, Jr.,28 as counsel. Con26 The committee was composed of barbers Wyche, Harrison Brown, and Ike Oliver,
and dry cleaning store owner Martin Williams.
27 Record at 5-11, United States v. Ward, 222 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 349
F.2d 795, modified, 352 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1965) (testimony of Zelma C. Wyche) [this portion of the Record hereinafter cited as Wyche Testimony]. (The questions put to the
witness are omitted from this quoted portion to permit a continuous narrative statement.
The testimony has been edited to avoid repetitions, and bracketed words and phrases
have been inserted for clarification.)
28 Sharp was at that time the only black attorney in northeast Louisiana. For a documentation of the difficulties he encountered before Southern judges, see Sharp v. Lucky,
148 F. Supp. 8 (W.D. La. 1957), rev'd, 252 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1958), on remand, 165 F. Supp.
405 (W.D. La. 1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d 842 (1959), in which Sharp sued for money damages
alleging injury to him as a black attorney. For a discussion of Sharp's difficulties as counsel for black plaintiffs, see M. Psuca, supra note 17, at 43. Sharp's client, Dr. Reddix,
technically won his suit, R'eddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1958), but class relief
was denied and Reddix dismissed Sharp.
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tinuing the negotiation approach preferred by parish representatives, 29
Sharp contacted the Registrar of Voters, the town's Mayor, and the
Judge of Louisiana's Sixth Judicial Court to seek their cooperation in
correcting the registration procedures. Having received no response to
his inquiry,30 Sharp visited the Registrar's office. Registrar Mary K.
Ward 31 informed him that there was an agreement between the parishes of East Carrol, Madison, and Tensas to the effect that Negroes
would not be permitted to register. 32 She stated that she was operating
under instructions from several public officials, including Sheriff C. E.
33
Hester, and that Sharp should discuss the matter with them.
At Sheriff Hester's office two armed officers were present during the
interview.
I was somewhat surprised at the intimidating fashion in which
he went about it ....Sheriff Hester began at that moment to
denounce the administration of Mr. Truman, and he did seem
to express just a little more regard for the administration of
Mr. Eisenhower, and he told me that I was sitting on a powder
keg; that in effect he said that if I pursued what appeared to
be my purpose any further, that he would take me for a ride.
He further stated that any efforts that I would make in that
direction I could assure myself that I would not have any
34
protection whatsoever from his office.
In a letter to Wyche recounting this experience, Sharp concluded that
"legal proceedings are indicated and in my opinion ... in order."3 5 An
additional unsuccessful attempt to register confirmed the necessity for
litigation and provided the incident on which to base a complaint.36
29 "I wish to confirm our decision at a recent conference to use all peaceful means to
solve this problem before legal action is taken; to withhold legal proceedings in any event
until the books are closed for registration in the coming election." Letter from James

Sharp, Jr. to Zelma C. Wyche, Mar. 1, 1954.
30 Letter from James Sharp, Jr. to Judge Frank Voelker, Sr., of the Sixth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, Mar. 1, 1954 (copies were sent to Mayor Sevier and Registrar
Ward) (copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review).
31 Mrs. Ward had held the appointive position of Registrar of Voters since 1931;
she retired in 1955.
32 Letter from James Sharp, Jr. to Zelma C. Wyche, Mar. 26, 1954 (copy on file at The
University of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Sharp Letter].
33 1961 Civil Rights Hearings,supra note 24, at 35 (testimony of James Sharp, Jr.).
34

Id. at 36. Compare the sworn statement submitted by Sheriff Hester to the Com-

mission on April 26, 1961. Id. at 755.
35 Sharp Letter, supra note 32.
36 This experience was a duplicate of previous attempts to register. However, Sheriff
Hester erased any doubts concerning the feasibility of future applications by stating that

there "wasn't any niggers registered on the books, and . . . 'as long as I am Sheriff
there won't be any registered on the books, and I am tired of you coming up here."'

Wyche Testimony, supra note 27.
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PRE-VOTING RIGHTS ACT LITIGATION

The Private Suit: A Lesson in Futility

In 1954, blacks faced substantial barriers when instituting litigation. 7
While the Department of Justice could file criminal charges,38 it was
assumed that only the aggrieved private parties, and not the federal
government, had standing to bring civil actions for damages or equitable relief.3 9 Moreover, fear of intimidation, lack of finances, difficulty
in adducing evidence, and expectations of unfavorable verdicts from
Southern jurors deterred individuals from initiating proceedings. 40
In weighing these factors, Madison Parish blacks deemphasized possible intimidation. Although harassment could be anticipated, black
leaders believed that citizens in northeast Louisiana rarely resorted to
violence when dealing with civil rights problems. 41 Additionally, individuals who attempted to register were self-employed and served the
black community; the impact of unofficial economic sanctions by local
37 Although Congress had passed three comprehensive Civil Rights Acts following the
Civil War, only five enforcement provisions remained in force by 1954. The Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 14 Star. 27 (1866), evolved into 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 and 18 U.S.C. § 242
(Supp. V, 1965-69). Three sections of the major Reconstruction legislation, the Enforcement Acts of 1870, 16 Stat. 40 (1870), survived judicial emasculation and Congressional
repeal in 28 Star. 36 (1894): 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1964) (criminal sanctions) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (1964) (restating the fifteenth amendment but providing no sanctions). The 1871
Act provided for civil damages and equitable relief and was usually joined to § 1971, 17
Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (Supp. V, 1965-69). For a discussion of these Acts
with respect to voting and the general development of civil rights litigation, see Kommers,
The Right to Vote and Its Implementation, 39 NoTaE DAME LAW. 365 (1964); Note, Federal Civil Rights Legislation, 54 Nw. L. REv. 332 (1959); Note, Federal Legislation to
Safeguard Voting Rights: The Civil Rights Act of 1960, 46 VA. L. REV. 945, 949-54 (1960);
cf. Bonfield, The Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 CORNELL L. REV. 108 (1960).
38 For general criticism of government initiative in the field of criminal civil rights
litigation, see Comment, Discretion to ProsecuteFederal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YAE L.J.
1297 (1965); cf. 1961 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 21, at 75 n.18 ("the criminal statutes
were unwieldy and difficult to apply'). See also 1957 LA. ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 109 (1957)
(Louisiana federal grand jury refused to issue indictments in connection with voter
registration discrimination). But see R. CARa, FEDERAL PROTECON OF CIvIL RIGHTs 198
(1947) (arguing that criminal sanctions here operate to order society without resort to punitive actions).
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1983, 1985 (Supp. V, 1965-69). But see In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1894).
Few private suits in the area of voting were filed between 1870 and 1957. See 1961 CiviL
RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 21, at 134; Kommers, supra note 37, at 372. For analysis
of
recent private suits, see Niles, Civil Actions for Damages under the Federal Civil Rights
Statutes, 45 TEX. L. REv. 1015 (1967).
40 Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3
(1965). The Government had similar problems once it undertook civil actions. See text at
notes 69-73 infra.
41 Interview with Zelma C. Wyche, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 28, 1970 [hereinafter cited as
Wyche Interview.
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whites would, therefore, be minor. Since the complainants were willing
to testify about discussions held with Mrs. Ward and Sheriff C. E.
Hester during recent unsuccessful attempts to register, the only anticipated difficulty was proving that the Registrar did not require "unknown" white applicants to meet the standards imposed on black
citizens. In this regard, the plaintiffs hoped that a 1952 injunctive
order against discriminatory use of the voucher in Bossier Parish
would provide the basis for asking the district judge to find discrimination through statistical evidence. Noting that more than nine thousand
whites and no blacks were registered to vote, Judge Porterie of the
Western District of Louisiana had concluded in the Bossier Parish case:
"This is enough taken arithmetically to give plaintiffs the injunction
42
they seek.
Since "the time to act had arrived,"4 3 Sharp filed a class action
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana on June 16, 1954.44 The complaint alleged, first, that the
identification requirement of the Louisiana registration laws was unconstitutional on its face and, second, that even if constitutional the
regulation was being discriminatorily applied by Mrs. Ward. The plaintiffs sought damages of $5,000 apiece. 45 Judge Benjamin C. Dawkins,
Jr. set the hearing for November 23, 1954.46
Because of a flat tire, the complainants arrived late at the courthouse, which is located in Monroe, 75 miles from Tallulah. Judge
Dawkins called their case first and, the plaintiffs not being present,
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 47 Participants contend that
Sharp did not file another suit for financial reasons. However, a sec42 Byrd v. Brice, 104 F. Supp. 442, 443 (W.D. La 1952), aff'd, 201 F.2d 664 (5th Cir.
1953). The population of Bossier Parish was composed of 22,227 whites and 13,912 blacks.
43 Wyche Interview, supra note 41. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), had
been handed down on May 17, 1954.
It would be impossible for a white person to understand what happened within
black breasts on that Monday. An ardent segregationist has called it "Black Monday." He was right, but for reasons other than the ones he advances; that was the
day we won; the day we took the white man's laws and won our case before an
all white Supreme Court with a Negro lawyer, Thurgood Marshall, as our chief
counsel. And we were proud.
L. LoMAx, THE NEGRo R VOLT 84 (1963).
44 Wyche v. Ward, Civil No. 4628, (W.D. La., filed June 16, 1954).
45 The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1983 (1964).
46 Judge Dawkins, a Democrat, was appointed by President Eisenhower in 1953 to
succeed his father, Benjamin C. Dawkins, Sr., who had sat on the bench since 1924. Judge
Dawkins has sat as trial judge in every voting case concerning Madison Parish.
47 The litigants contend that they were only five minutes late. "The Judge, knowing
that this was an opportune moment to get rid of us once and for all, called us up first.
We were not there and he threw the case out. We lost that round." Wyche Interview,
supra note 41. On September 14, 1959, a formal order of dismissal was made by the
court in the absence of counsel's submission of a formal decree.
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ond filing fee of $25 would not have drained the plaintiffs' financial
resources. Rather, it appears that counsel saw no hope of receiving
favorable rulings from Judge Dawkins, and the plaintiffs became dis48
couraged as they envisioned a succession of futile suits.

Wyche v. Ward represents only one of the cumulatively expensive 49
and unsuccessful50 private attempts undertaken at this time to secure
the franchise. Locally, these suits forced community leaders to create
strong grass-roots organizations which could function as pressure groups
in the face of insufficient legal remedies and the exercise of unbridled
discretion by local officials and the federal judiciary. Nationally, these
cases 5 provided the evidence for early arguments that the inequities
in the dual school system described in Brown v. Board of Education 2
represented only one discrediting aspect of race relations in the South.
This contention gained support as state legislatures acted to insure
48 Even if Judge Dawkins had found for the plaintiffs, he might not have withdrawn
the Registrar's discretion. In Byrd, Judge Porterie did not order registration of the complainants, stating that (1) they had not been tested as required by state law, and (2) even
if they had been, "a direct mandate from us would be usurpation by us of the discretionary
function of the registrar." Instead, the judge instructed that "the registrar must become
convinced that the Negroes are entitled to the benefit of the same time and trouble she
gives to the white applicants in her seeking to identify them. This, we think, will be an
immediate solution of the situation." 104 F. Supp. at 443-44.
49 Plaintiffs challenging disfranchisement in the courts are estimated to have spent over
$500,000. W. Wnrrm, How FAR THE PROMIsED LAND 65-66 (1955). Additionally, only a handful of blacks have been registered after years of delay, appeals, and remands. A representative case is Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Ala. 1945), a class action voter
registration suit for injunctive relief and damages in which the complaint was dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and because the black plaintiff could not
maintain a class action. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that
exhaustion was not required. 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1946). The hearing on the merits
resulted in a decision for the defendants. 69 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ala. 1947). While the
case was again being appealed to the Fifth Circuit, the defendant registrar produced a
photocopy of Mitchell's registration certificate, dated January 20, 1943-two years prior to
filing of the suit-showing Mitchell to be a certified voter. Mitchell had never been
notified that his application had been "accepted," nor had the defendant registrar produced
the certificate during the two and one-half years of litigation. Accord, Davis v. Schell, 81 F.
Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (condemning discriminatory
application of registration tests and resulting in the registration of ten blacks).
50 In East Carrol Parish, a suit was filed against the registrar of voters in 1951. It
dragged on "from 1951 until 1957 [when] Jurist Ben Dawkins put us out of his court, said
he had no jurisdiction, it belonged to the three-judge court, and after that our attorney
went off to California." 1961 Civil Rights Hearings,supra note 24, at 22 (testimony of Rev.
John H. Scott); cf. Sellers v. Wilson, 123 F. Supp. 917 (M.D. Ala. 1954) (allegations of discriminatory treatment upheld but injunctive relief denied on the ground that the defendant members of the board had resigned).
51 For descriptions of the accumulated instances of refusal to grant injunctive relief
and their effect, see 1959 CrvL RIGrs REPo T, supra note 18; 1961 Civil Rights Hearings,
supra note 24.
52 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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adherence to the philosophy 3 and practice 54 of white supremacy. Moreover, state agencies and local organizations cooperated 5 in a program
of retrenchment 6 designed to maintain white control of state and local
politics. 57
B.

The Government Suit: A Lesson in Frustration

Congress eventually gave formal recognition to the inadequacy of
private party litigation by passing the Civil Rights Acts of 1957is and
1960.59 The 1957 Act authorized preventive relief to be sought by the
Attorney General on behalf of one or more individuals threatened with
deprivation of the right to vote, 0 prohibited any person from purpose53 The Louisiana Legislature established a Joint Legislative Committee "to provide the
ways and means whereby [the] existing social order shall be preserved," La. H.R. Con.
Res. No. 27, July, 1954, and further emphasized its intention by mandating that the Committee "maintain segregation of the races in all phases of [Louisiana] life in accordance
with the customs, traditions and laws of [the] state," La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 9, May, 1956.
For a discussion of Southern state government activity, see Note, Federal Protection of
Negro Voting Rights, 51 Va. L. Rev. 1051, 1068-79 (Louisiana), 1081-91 (Mississippi), 10931100 (Alabama) (1965).
54 To insure administrative compliance, the Louisiana Legislature enacted a series
of laws regulating the activity of registrars, see Kommers, supra note 37, at 397-98, and
amended the Louisiana Constitution to provide for registrant disqualification on grounds
of "bad character," which included conviction of a misdemeanor carrying a six-month
prison sentence, participation in a comon law marriage, and parentage of illegitimate
children. These designations were not exclusive and other evidence of bad character could
be used by the registrar to disqualify. LA. CONsr. art. VII1, § 1(c); see 1961 Civit. RIrrs
REPORT, supra note 21, at 68-70; Kommers, supra note 37, at 397-98.
55 The Association of Citizens Councils of Louisiana arranged to purge black registrants,
suggested means to discipline or remove uncooperative registrars, and published an inflammatory "manual of procedure for registrars of voters"; the pamphlet, entitled "Voter
Qualification Laws in Louisiana: The Key to Victory in the Segregation Struggle," provided the basis for discussion at conferences sponsored by the Joint Legislative Committee
and the State Board of Registrars. See 1961 Civil Rights Hearings,supra note 24, at 526-29,
532-46. See also United States v. Association of Citizens Councils, 187 F. Supp. 846 (W.D.
La. 1960).
56 1961 Civio RIGHTs REPORT, supra note 21, at 43. Id. at 39-72 documents this concerted
action and discusses various aspects of discriminatory conduct in Louisiana between 1954
and 1961. See also LmRARY oF CONGRESS, Civu. RIGHTS PRoJECT: REPORT LOUISIANA No. 1
218-19 (Oct. 23, 1958) (statement of Louisiana Attorney General Jack GremiUion).
57 While black participation in elections may have rankled less than the anticipated desegration of schools, see the "rank order of discrimination" analysis in G. MYRDAL, AN
AM ERICAN DiI.zE.-wA 60-61 (1944), fear of the effect of black voting is reflected in the sudden reversal of the trend in Louisiana of increased black registration. The percentage of
blacks registered in Louisiana, having jumped from 3.0% in 1948 to 10.2% in 1952, reflected steady growth until July, 1954, when 13.3% of eligible blacks were on the rolls.
The figure stabilized near the 13.7% level (except for a sporadic jump to 15.3% in May,
1956) until July, 1960. 1961 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 24, at 424.
58 71 Stat. 634 (1957); see Lane, The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 4 How. L.J. 36 (1958);
Note, Federal Civil Rights Legislation, supra note 37.
59 74 Stat. 86 (1960).
00 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1964).
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fully interfering with that right, 61 and established the United States
Commission on Civil Rights. 62 While ambitious, the 1957 Act did not
materially aid disfranchised blacks. Between 1957 and 1960 the Department of Justice initiated only four actions, 6 3 not one of which resulted in placing blacks on the voting rolls for the first time. 64 The
Commission, which had been authorized to investigate complaints of
voting rights deprivation, met with a series of legal challenges which
delayed its effective functioning. 65 In 1959 the Commission finally concluded: "Against the prejudice of registrars and jurors, the U.S. Government appears under present laws to be helpless to make good the
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution."6 6
Congress, therefore, strengthened the means for securing registration of qualified applicants in the 1960 Civil Rights Act. 67 Whenever
a government-initiated suit established denial of the franchise because
of race, color, or creed, the Attorney General could request that a
federal district court enter a finding of deprivation of rights pursuant
to a pattern or practice of discrimination. Such determination would
permit any resident within the defendant's jurisdiction to apply to
the court for an order declaring him qualified to vote in any election,
providing the applicant was qualified to vote under state law and had,
subsequent to the court's "pattern or practice" finding, been denied
Id. at § 1971(b).
Id. at § 1975. The Act also restated the Enforcement Acts' right-to-vote policy, id.
at § 1971(a)(1); eliminated the exhaustion of remedies requirement for federal jurisdiction,
id. at § 1971(d); empowered district court judges to hear criminal contempt cases without
a jury if the sentence did not exceed a $300 fine and 45 days' imprisonment, id. at § 1995;
provided for an additional assistant attorney general, 5 U.S.C. § 295-1 (1964); and eliminated the requirement that federal jurors must qualify under state law, 28 U.S.C. § 1861
(1958).
63 Christopher, supra note 40, at 4.
64 For an explanation of the year's delay in filing this small number of suits on
grounds that the first cases had to be "factually strong" to provide support against assertions of the Act's unconstitutionality, see Hearings on S. 2684, S. 2719, S. 2783, S. 2814,
S. 2722., S. 2785 and S. 2535 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1960) (testimony of Attorney General William P. Rogers), criticized
and evaluated in 1959 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 18, at 128-33; Note, The Civil
Rights Act of 1960, supra note 37 at 957-61.
65 Even Congress' research tool, the United States Commission on Civil Rights, proved
a slow starter by initially lacking material to investigate, 1959 CIVIL RIGHTS RE-PORT,
supra note 18, at xiii, 98-99, and finding its hearings delayed by legal challenges, see
Larche v. Hannah, 176 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. La. 1959), aff'd., 177 F. Supp. 816 (1959) (threejudge panel), rev'd, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). For an early history of the Commission's activities,
see generally 1959 CIvIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 18, at 55-97.
66 Id. at 3.
67 The Act, 74 Stat. 86 (1960), was signed on May 6, 1960, by President Eisenhower. For
a general history and preliminary analysis, see Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1960, supra
note 37.For a detailed account of the legislative history, see D. BERMAN, A BILL BECOMES A
LAw: THE CIvIL RIGHTS OF 1960 (1962).
61
62
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the opportunity to register or to vote by persons acting under color
of state law. Additionally, the legislation permitted discretionary court
appointment of federal referees to receive applications, hear evidence
ex parte, and present findings to the court on the applicant's eligibility
68
for relief.
However, even after passage of the 1960 Act, severe hurdles to government action remained. These deficiencies are highlighted in United
States v. Ward,0 9 a 1961 suit in which the Government sought to force
abandonment of the voucher requirement as applied in Madison Parish,
and to enjoin local officials from subjecting black applicants for registration to different and more stringent standards than were applied to
white persons.
The first problem the Government encountered was convincing black
residents to make the necessary attempt to register which would enable
the Department of Justice to bring suit. While preparing a voting discrimination case in neighboring East Carroll Parish, 70 government
attorneys periodically visited Tallulah and discussed the Madison Parish situation, giving informal assurances that failure of a new attempt
to register would initiate an investigation likely to result in the filing
of a federal suit.71 However, black residents took no action until

August 28, 1961; once again failure to fulfill the voucher requirement
defeated the registration attempt.72 The Government filed suit on
October 21, 1961.
While black residents do not remember why they hesitated to act
despite the obvious desire of government attorneys to begin proceed08 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. V, 1965-69), held constitutional in US. v. Manning, 215 F.
Supp. 272 (W.D. La. 1963). Additionally, the Act provides for presentation, production,
and inspection of voting records at the request of the Attorney General, 42 U.S.C. § 1974
(a)-(e).
69 222 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 349 F.2d 795, modified, 352 F.2d 329 (5th
Cir. 1965).
70 United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. La. 1962).
71 Interviews with attorneys in the Civil Rights Division, United States Department of
Justice, in Washington, D.C., Nov. 23-24, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Department of Justice
Interviews].
72 The registration attempt produced a unique dialogue indicating the tragicomic absurdity of Miss Ward's application of the voucher requirement. Wyche testified at the
Ward trial:
[The Registrar told us] "you will have to have two electors, as I have previously
said, because I don't know any of you."
And I said, "I am Zelma C. Wyche."
And the Registrar said, "You are the one who filed the lawsuit against my
mother [the former Registrar]."
I said, "I am."
She said, "I still don't know you. You will have to get someone to identify you."

Wyche Testimony, supra note 27.
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ings,73 it appears that increasing harassment influenced their decisions7 4
A black minister was arrested twice and beaten75 after testifying before
the Civil Rights Commission in September, 1960. 76 Wyche was subjected to unusual harassment in his Army Reserve unit, which eventually forced his resignation after sixteen years' service.7 7 Harrison
Brown, another leader of the black community, declined to testify before the Commission because he feared subsequent financial retaliation
8
by whites and the possible loss of his wife's teaching position.
The second problem attached to government suits filed under authority of section 1971(a) was the necessity for county-by-county litigation. Although an action attacking the voucher requirement had been
brought in neighboring East Carroll Parish, 79 a favorable decision from
Judge Dawkins in that case could not aid Madison Parish blacks. No
assumption was permitted that lopsided registration figures and a "pattern or practice" finding against one registrar were conclusive of discriminatory activities in another parish, despite identity of legal theory
and striking similarity of evidence.8 0 Nor could the Government rely
solely on statistical evidence of voting patterns within Madison Parish
itself to prove its case. Although the Fifth Circuit had suggested, s and
Judge Dawkins eventually held, 2 that disparate registration and popu73 Elliot C. Nolley, a store owner registered in Ouachita Parish until he was purged in
1956, had written to the Department of Justice and had been visited by Federal Bureau
of Investigation agents requesting him to register; he declined. Fieldworker's Report, Aug.
8, 1960, on file at the United States Commission on Civil Rights.
74 Madison Parish blacks continually denied, however, that harassment or intimidation
affected their activities. Interviews with local residents, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 26, 1970.
75 Fieldworker's Report, Nov. 15, 1960, on file at the United States Commission on Civil
Rights. Compare United States v. Deal, 6 RAcE REL. L. REP. 474 (1961), in which East
Carroll residents retaliated against fanner Joe Atlas, who had testified before the Commission, by refusing to gin his cotton and conduct ordinary business with him. Following
intervention by the Department of Justice, the court issued a consent decree by which
boycotting merchants agreed to desist.
76 1961 Civil Rights Hearings,supra note 24, at 29 (describing in detail another attempt
to register). Compare the account given by Sheriff Hester in a sworn statement submitted
to the Commission on April 26, 1961, following the Commission's invitation to respond
to Rev. Neal's testimony. Id. at 754.
77 Fieldworker's Report, Apr. 4, 1960, on file at the United States Commission on Civil
Rights (report of interview with Wyche). Wyche specifically stated that his Army trouble
stemmed from the fact that white citizens had learned he was to appear at a Commission
hearing in Shreveport, Louisiana. Id.
78 Fieldworker's Report, Aug. 8, 1960, on file at the United States Commission on Civil
Rights.
79 United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. La. 1962).
80 No blacks had been registered in Madison Parish during this century, United States
v. Ward, 222 F. Supp. 617, 618 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 349 F.2d 795, modified, 352 F.2d 329
(5th Cir. 1965), nor in East Carroll since 1922, United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172
(W.D. La. 1962).
83 Alabama v. United States, 804 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
82 Where it is shown, as in this case, that, prior to the trial, none of the more than
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lation figures could constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination,
establishing the fact of segregated patterns was not enough. To obtain
effective relief the Government needed to identify specific acts of discrimination. In Ward, 21 blacks testified that they had been denied
applications for failure to meet the personal identification requirement.8 3 Additionally, the Government called Katherine Ward, the new
Registrar, to describe the registration system she used;8 4 presented testimony that a general understanding existed among white people that
they would not identify blacks; 85 and demonstrated that Miss Ward
knowingly utilized the voucher requirement to prevent registration of

blacks.8 6
Amassing the evidence necessary to supplement registration statistics
5,000 Negroes of voting age in the Parish had been registered since 1900, and a
majority of the white persons of voting age were allowed to register to vote, and
a number of Negroes attempted to register to vote, this evidence alone establishes a claim for relief under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and
under the Civil Rights Act of 1957, as amended. It must be concluded that
Negroes were systematically excluded from registration for voting.
United States v. Ward, 222 F. Supp. 617, 620 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 349 F.2d 795, modified,
352 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1965); accord, United States v. Wilder, 222 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. La.
1963); United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172, 174 (W.D. La. 1962). Since the Government did not rest upon presenting the statistical evidence in these cases, it is impossible
to know whether Judge Dawkins would have made his conclusion of law absent the additional evidence of attempts by blacks to register. But see the refusals of other district
courts to grant statistics even probative value. United States v. Logue, 9 RACE REL. L. REP.
770 (S.D. Ala. 1964), rev'd, 344 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1965) (Thomas, J.); United States v.
Ramsey, 8 RACE REL. L. Rm. 156 (S.D. Miss. 1963), rev'd, 331 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964),
modified, 353 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1965) (Cox, J.); United States v. Duke, 9 RAE REL. L. REP.
788 (M.D. Ala. 1963), rev'd, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964) (Clayton, J.). Compare the Fifth
Circuit's refusal to find discrimination based on voting statistics showing that 92% of
white applicants were accepted while 62% of Negroes were not. United States v. Atkins,
323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963), af'g 210 F. Supp. 441 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
88 Brief for Plaintiff at 17.
84 Miss Ward did not use the literacy test, which was optional, 47 LA. REv. STAT.
§§ 18:35-:36 (1969), but "qualified her voters" by determining age, residency, citizenship, and absence of conviction of a crime, id. at § 18:31, before permitting an applicant to fill out a form. If she knew an applicant or if the applicant had previously
registered, no additional identification was required for issuance of a new certificate.
Miss Ward stated that she knew many white people in the parish because she had been
born and raised there but that she knew very few Negroes, "only those who work for me
or help me." Record at 122, 104-105, 107-108.
85 Tax Assessor Speigner, who had vouched for two white persons, stated that he did
not want to identify blacks because "he didn't care to have anything to do with it."
Record at 26. The Government demonstrated that 37 whites had been identified by public
officials (including two by Sheriff Hester, four by Clerk of Court Post, and 23 by six of
the sheriff's deputies), and four blacks testified that white men they approached refused
to identify them. Brief for Plaintiff, App. B, Table 2.
86 Miss Ward testified she knew that no blacks had been registered in the past while
most whites had, and that no black had ever been identified by a white person. Moreover,
when Wyche's group appeared at her office on August 28, Miss Ward testified, "[I]t was the
first time any colored persons had been in my office and it struck me as being a little
peculiar or strange." Record at 103.
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required exhaustive preparation. Each government case demanded the
presence of five lawyers for a minimum of one month to analyze all
registration forms. Thus, for each county in which it brought suit,
the Government spent at least 1,200 attorney-hours just to acquire complete command of registration material;8 7 it is impossible to estimate

the time spent interviewing residents, preparing for trial, litigating the case, filing memorandums, and, inevitably, briefing and arguing
appeals.88
While the inherent delays in county-by-county litigation compounded
the Government's difficulties, the discretionary nature of relief under
the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts eventually proved to be the major
obstacle. Despite a finding that the voucher requirement unconstitutionally deprived Madison Parish blacks of the right to vote,8 9 Judge
Dawkins did not grant adequate relief. His final decree merely (1)
enjoined use of the voucher to establish identity, (2) provided that the
Registrar's records be available to government agents, and (3) required
submission of periodic reports to the court detailing progress in processing registration applications. 90
These orders did not seriously affect the defendants' activities. Registrar Ward had already abandoned the voucher requirement in September, 1962, substituting more stringent registration procedures.9 1
Therefore, the injunction merely proscribed the application of a standard no longer in use, and Judge Dawkins' condemnation of the strict
identification practice amounted to no more than judicial affirmance.
that the "voluntary abandonment" must continue. Similarly, since the
Civil Rights Act of 1960 required registrars to make records available
to government agents, the order's provision for inspection and photographing at all reasonable times merely insured future access without resort to court order. Moreover, the Government itself had indicated a willingness to accept less coercive sanctions by suggesting
that Judge Dawkins adopt the monthly reports requirement as an alternative to appointing a voter referee. 92 Thus, the plaintiff's victory
87 Compare this Department of Justice estimate with Attorney General Katzenbach's
statement that it has become routine to spend as many as six thousand man-hours only
in analyzing the voting records of a single county. H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1965).
88 Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.
89 222 F. Supp. at 620.
90 Id. at 620-21.
91 See text at notes 94-96 infra.
92 Judge Dawkins had previously assumed this overseer role at the Government's suggestion. United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172, 175 (W.D. La. 1961). The Manning
decision included a finding of discrimination pursuant to a "pattern or practice." It has
been conjectured that Dawkins did not realize the implications of using the statutory
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amounted to a decree ordering the defendants to do that which they
were already doing or could be required to do through pro forma
application for a court order. The real significance of this decision lies,
therefore, in Judge Dawkins' power to deny, subject to appeal, certain
relief requested by the Government: (1) a finding of discrimination
pursuant to a "pattern or practice;" (2) an order that standards applied
to future applicants for registration be those which had been used between January 1, 1961 and August 31, 1962 (freezing relief); 93 and
(3) an assessment of costs against the State of Louisiana as well as
Registrar Ward.
The failure to make a "pattern or practice" finding precluded either
judicial registration of voters or the appointment of referees pursuant
to section 1971(e) of the 1960 Civil Rights Act. The defendants, therefore, remained in control of the Madison Parish voter registration machinery. Moreover, the defendants had freedom to operate that
machinery in a discriminatory manner as a result of Judge Dawkins'
failure to order use of the former registration requirements in judging
future voter applicants. Even at the time of trial it had been quite
clear that the defendants were shifting to other discriminatory tactics
in lieu of the voucher requirement.
First, in September, 1962, Registrar Ward had put into practice the
"citizenship test" approved by the Louisiana legislature the previous
month. 94 Using this standard, an applicant could not qualify for
registration unless he answered correctly four out of six multiple choice
questions on citizenship, government, and history. Additionally, applicants were required to read and write from dictation a portion of the
preamble to the United States Constitution.9 5 Since a system of permanent registration had been instituted in February, 1963, the stricter
requirements were inapplicable to those persons who had registered
prior to September, 1962 on the basis of age, residence, and no criminal
conviction, all of whom were white.
A second pre-trial innovation concerned the application form which
language and that he never intended to provide the means for triggering the 1971(e)
machinery. C. Hamilton, Southern Federal Courts and the Negro Vote 207, 1957 (unpublished dissertation in Regenstein Library, The University of Chicago).
93 Prior to trial no blacks had been registered and registration was periodic; a complete registration was held every four years. See LA. REv. STAT. §§ 18:231, 18:249 (Supp.
1969). On February 14, 1963, the police jury changed to a system of permanent registration.
Therefore, the Government argued, past inequities would be perpetuated for many years
if the lenient pre-September, 1962 requirements were not applied-at least until the
effects of discrimination were eradicated. For extensive discussions of freezing relief, see
Fiss, Gaston County v. United States: Fruition of the Freezing Principle, 1969 Sup. CT. Rkv.
379; Note, supra note 53, at 1137-52.
94 LA. Rrv. STAT. § 18:191 (Supp. 1969).
95 Record at 131-32.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 38:726

had been used formerly as a means to obtain and record essential
information about substantive qualifications of applicants; with abandonment of the voucher it had been transformed into a device to test
literacy. The applicant was required to fill in the card himself without
any assistance or supervision. To avoid "passing" through memorization, five different forms were used to elicit the same information.90
Having anticipated that the Registrar might attempt to use literacy
as a means of disqualifying blacks should the voucher procedure be
prohibited, the Government had sought to establish at trial the standard of acceptability for application forms previously set by Miss Ward.
Each card was examined for mistakes; in court the Government presented successive cards with identical but unique mistakes, raising the
inference that many applicants copied one form.9 7 Searches were made
for the "lowest standard" registered voter who had filled out his own
card. Arguably, his form would become the basis of comparison for all
future applications 98 since the Louisiana Constitution had been
amended in 1960 to refuse illiterates the right to vote. 99 Moreover, a
handwriting expert attested to the Registrar's practice of completing
cards for applicants. Through testimony the Government established
that 1760 out of 1762 applicants or 99.9 per cent were registered, that
Miss Ward accepted all applications unless they looked "ridiculous,"
and that she pointed out errors to applicants and permitted them to
fill out new cards. 100
Abrogation of these lenient standards would inevitably place a
heavy burden on all future registrants, but, more importantly, the
results of past, flagrant discrimination would be frozen in and perpetuated. 101 However, the attempt to set a literacy standard which
9G Id.

97 This thorough preparation revealed facts unknown to the defense. Counsel, caught
unawares, merely continued to argue Miss Ward's adherence to the law. Moreover, counsel
for Miss Ward never submitted a post-trial brief.
98 This technique was first adopted in Mississippi. Investigators would tour the community looking for the most deplorable living accommodations and then would determine
whether the occupants were registered. Madison Parish's most "illiterate literate white
voter" was found living under a railroad bridge siding. He was so far removed from the
white power structure and so poorly informed about the parish's struggle to prevent black
voting that on being subpoenaed to appear at trial, rather than ask a white citizen for a
lift, he requested Wyche to help him get to the federal courthouse in Monroe. Since it
was a civil rights matter, he assumed that Wyche was behind it and that no white citizens
would be involved. Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.
99 LA. CONST. art. 8, § l(d), as amended on November 8, 1960. However, it should be
noted that illiterates already on the rolls would remain registered.
10o Record at 98, 122.
101 In presenting this evidence, the Government raised the possibility of future discrimination through registrar discretion by questioning the timing behind altered
registration procedures. If prior to September, 1962, whites registered at will without
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would, in effect, reflect past standards failed. Despite a century of
segregation and evidence of current discrimination, Judge Dawkins
refused either to take the voter registration machinery out of the
defendants' hands or to control significantly the way in which the
defendants operated that machinery.
The Government did not challenge Judge Dawkins' omission of the
"pattern or practice" finding, which would trigger the assignment of
voter referees, or the judicial registration of voters under section
1971(e). Department of Justice analysts felt that the court's decision
included statements sufficient to set the 1971(e) machinery in force
"even though the judge clearly does not intend for it to."' 0 2 Referees
were never requested, however; until proven insufficient the Government was willing to accept Judge Dawkins' adoption of the limited
overseer role.
The Department of Justice, did, however, appeal Judge Dawkins'
refusal to grant freezing relief. In August, 1965, the Fifth Circuit reversed the Ward decision and ordered suspension of nondiscriminatory
voting qualifications not previously applied to white citizens. 10 3 The
court, additionally, used this opportunity to indicate the contours of
the freezing remedy. 10 4 Of primary importance, however, was the Fifth
Circuit's recognition that the 1960 Act erred in permitting significant
being subject to any test while blacks were not permitted to register at all because
of their race, the Department of Justice suggested, it was far from coincidental that
strict standards and difficult tests were adopted following initiation of federal court
action-that is, only after the Registrar recognized that she would be forced to permit
blacks to apply.
102 Memorandum from Frank Dunbaugh, attorney in the Civil Rights Division, United
States Department of Justice, to Assistant Attorney General John Doar, Nov. 12, 1963.
This assumption was borne out by the Fifth Circuit when Ward was appealed. 349 F.2d at
800. Judge Brown stated: "The decree entered by the District Court . . . although not
using the exact phraseology of 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) . . . found a discriminatory pattern and
practice." The court, additionally, took this opportunity to instruct that the "pattern or
practice" finding was not discretionary and should be made in the terminology of the
statute to expedite post-finding voter applications. Cf. United States v. Ramsey, 353 F.2d
650 (5th Cir. 1965), rev'g 331 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964) (Rives, J., dissenting strongly) (holding that the finding was discretionary).
103 United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795, modified, 352 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1965).
104 First, the court characterized the freeze order as "an effective equitable tool to
eradicate the consequences of past discrimination" rather than as an additional sanction
to the 1971(e) "pattern or practice" machinery. 349 F.2d at 803. Second, Judge Brown repudiated past decisions denying the remedy, id. at 801; explained the necessity for a twoyear conditional period of suspension, id. at 803 (but see United States v. Louisiana, 380
U.S. 145, 155 (1965); Note, supra note 53, at 1148); and extended coverage of related
registration standards to all applicants, whether or not they were of eligible age and
residence during the discriminatory period, noting that restricting eligibility created an
"incongruous conflict" between requirements placed on the Registrar, who could reject
applicants on the more rigid current standards, and those lax requirements used by the
court once rejection had been established, id. at 803-04.
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relief to depend on the discretion of Southern district judges.10 5 Accordingly, the Court instructed:
Voter registrars should come to learn that when the cases are
tried on the application for permanent injunction and the
facts establish a pattern or practice, the District Court must so
find. Next, the Judge must make the finding to set in operation the §1971(e) machinery. Next, he must enter a decree,
which, through suitable freeze provisions, effective for an adequate period of time, will assure that the evils of past discrimination be eradicated before new and more stringent state
provisions may be exacted of Negro applicants. The handwriting is indeed on the wall-in Mississippi Ward, in Lynd and
now Louisiana Ward. 0 6
The court also withdrew the district judge's discretion in apportioning costs.' 0 7 Although Judge Dawkins had taxed litigation expenses of

$1,468.77 against Miss Ward in her capacity as Registrar of Voters, he
had entered no assessment against the State of Louisiana. Characterizing the suit as a battle "between two sovereigns," the Fifth Circuit
summarily instructed the State to assume these costs. 08
105 Not only did district judges avoid the "pattern or practice" finding, but even
those who made the determination might decline to utilize 1971(e) machinery. See, e.g.,
United States v. Parker, 236 F. Supp. 511 (M.D. Ala. 1964); cf. United States v. Cartwright,
230 F. Supp. 878 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (not specifically rejecting a voter referee assignment but
decreeing only that certain named individuals be placed on the rolls).
After four years of litigation, Congress also recognized its error. The omnibus 1964
Civil Rights Act authorized three-judge district courts to decide suits at the request of
the Attorney General or the defendant when the Government requested a finding of
discriminatory pattern or practice. Hearing would be immediate and the decision would
be directly appealable to the Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(g) (Supp. V, 1965-69). The
provision did aid in removing some delays. Prior to 1964 the time lapse between the filing of
the complaint and the beginning of trial was 16.33 months, more than six months of which
was spent awaiting an answer. Between July, 1964 and February, 1965, of the seven
1971(a) suits fied the average time lapse between complaint and answer was less than
one month. One case went to trial during that time, and in two suits offers of consent
judgments were made by the defendants. 1 Hearings Before the U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights 259-60 (1965) (statement of Burke Marshall). The Act also established a rebuttable
presumption of literacy, id. at § 1971(c), and prohibited, in elections held solely or
in part for federal offices, registration procedures different from those used in the past,
rejection of applicants for immaterial errors or omissions, and use of literacy tests as a
voting qualifications unless administered and conducted wholly in writing, id at
§ 1971(a)(2).
106 349 F.2d at 805. Additionally, the court framed a proposed uniform decree which
would serve as a model for district judges and would be entered on remand, thereby
cutting down the time lag between formal grant of judicial relief and implementation of
that relief. Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. The court further characterized the state as having given Mrs. Ward aid and
comfort, financial as well as moral. Cf. United States v. Duke, 382 F.2d 759, 770 (5th Cir.
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C.

The Effects of Litigation

It has been argued that once the Fifth Circuit established freezing
relief and voter referee assignments to be mandatory, an effective
barrier to discriminatory registrar procedures had been erected and no
further federal legislation was necessary.1 0 9 Judge Tuttle, for example,
stated that
the courts of our circuit .

by the midsummer of 1965 had

disposed of substantially all of the legal questions that had
arisen from the continued reluctance of local officials in some
counties to accept the century-old command of the Fifteenth
Amendment. 110
It is admittedly idle to speculate whether the federal bench responded to the need for a radical remedy or to the pressure of impending federal legislation in developing the criteria for ordering and
fashioning "complete" substantial relief."' However, a reconsideration
of the delays, costs, and consequences incident to county-by-county
litigation vividly demonstrates the easily anticipated inadequacy of
continuing dependance on the judiciary to effectuate voter registration
2

policies."1

First, it could not be assumed that the Fifth Circuit's pronounce-

ments would be followed. In the past, frequent and explicit instructions
1964) (holding the state a necessary party for granting complete relief); accord, United
States v. Ward, 345 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 679 (5th
Cir. 1964).
109 It seems certain that if Congress had not invalidated discriminatory state voting
provisions and provided means to correct the effect of prior disfranchisement,
the judicial doctrines formulated by 1965 would have accomplished a similar
result.
Note, supra note 53, at 1189. But compare the statement of a knowledgeable northeast
Louisiana attorney:
After Brown, the derision heaped on the Supreme Court filtered down to the
lower federal courts. No Southerner expected honest compliance with district
court orders. While state officials expressed sympathy for the plight of Negroes,
and had no interest in resisting Negro registration once the [federal] examiners
were sent in, nothing at all would have happened if Congress hadn't forced it.
A court order could be ignored. An act of Congress commanded respect.
Interview with northeast Louisiana attorney, Oct. 27, 1970. See also the Louisiana
"interposition resolution" of May 29, 1956, La. H.R. Res. 10, 1956 Sess., repudiating
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and another case, reported in 1 RAcE REL. L.
R)E'. 753, 754-55 (1956).
110 Tuttle, Equality and the Vote, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 245 (1966).
111 The phrase is taken from Judge Johnson's original formulation of the concept underlying freezing relief. United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677, 682 (M.D. Ala. 1961),
aff'd, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
112 United States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145 (1963) (attacking use of the interpretation
and citizenship tests in 21 parishes) and United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965)
(challenging a variety of state voting procedures) represent attempts to avoid repeated
suits, but alternative discriminatory methods were still available. See Note, supra note 53,
at 1175-89.
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to the inferior courts had not halted evasive tactics. 115 There is little
reason to conclude that further explication of controlling legal doctrines and specific articulation of the court's expectations would automatically produce compliance.
Second, eight years of litigation provided the most persuasive argument that adjudication and court-developed enforcement tools could
not ensure extensive registration. 1 4 In Madison Parish, for example,
between the Ward trial and August 5, 1965, only 327 black citizens
succeeded in passing the citizenship and literacy tests.115 While whites
argued that this low registration demonstrated lack of interest in
political matters, other factors seem to provide a more plausible explanation. Initially, apprehension of "incorrectly answering" the citizenship questions restrained many from applying to register. School
teachers, among others, refused to permit white persons to gossip that
"they didn't even have enough sense to pass that simple test." 116 Once
the district court ordered termination of the Registrar's unofficial discretion, threats of job loss replaced fear of failure. 117 Additionally,
some black residents alleged that discriminatory delaying tactics were
used-admitting only one black applicant into the Registrar's office
while permitting four and five whites to fill in the forms at the same
time, using hypertechnical errors and omissions to invalidate application cards, and refusing such identification as electric bills to establish
residency because the company-issued receipts did not include dates."-,
As the culmination of a concentrated effort to provide both the
opportunity and the means for eradicating racially motivated disfranchisement, United States v. Ward and the seventy other Department of
113 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClellan, 341 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam);
Kennedy v. Lynd, 806 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 952 (1963).
114 Progress has been painfully slow, in part because of the intransigence of state
and local officials and repeated delays in the judicial process. Judicial relief has
had to be gaged not in terms of months-but in terms of years.. . . The judicial
process affords those who are determined to resist plentiful opportunity to resist.
Indeed, even after apparent defeat resisters seek new ways and means of discriminating. Barring one contrivance too often has caused no change in result,
only in methods.
H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1965).
115 By February 23, 1962, ten weeks after trial and eight months prior to Judge
Dawkins' decree, 174 blacks had been registered. 349 F.2d at 799.
116 Wyche Interview, supra note 41.
117 Sheriff Hester's fiat that "as long as I am Sheriff, there won't be any [niggers]
registered on the books," Record at 16, strongly negated the argument that the absence
of black voters resulted from voluntary disinterest. Judicial recognition of the Sheriff's
superordinate role and of the Registrar's complicity therein was established by the district
court. 222 F. Supp. at 619.
118 Interview with Harrison Brown, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 27, 1970 [hereinafter cited
as Brown Interview]. At no time did the Government investigate with the intent of
bringing a motion for contempt or prosecuting a suit under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (Supp.
V, 1965-69).
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Justice suits filed between 1957 and 1964119 present a dismal recommendation for redressing grievances through legal action. After eight
years of litigation, only 37,146 of 548,358 voting-age blacks had been
registered in the 46 counties which had been subjects of government
suits. 120 Moreover, intensive litigation in Alabama, Louisiana, and

Mississippi' 21 did not generate accelerated enrollment of black voters.
Between 1956 and 1965, black registration rose by only 3.0 per cent in
these three states as compared to an 18.3 per cent average increase for
122
the eleven Southern states.
While these figures highlight certain inadequacies of judicial enforcement, secondary gains should not be overlooked when evaluating
the effect of litigation. In addition to opening registration rolls, through
voting rights suits the Government sought to influence behavior patterns of the white leadership. Department of Justice attorneys indicate
that they succeeded, for example, in forcing some district judges to
confront the blatant misconduct of local officials. 123 They believe,
moreover, that Judge Dawkins became so indignant over the refusal of
officials to register blacks that he threatened in private to appoint a
24
voter referee if intransigence persisted.
119 Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.
120 Note, supra note 53, at 1196, based on figures in Hearings on S. 1564 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1175 et seq. (1965).
121 Between 1960 and 1964, the Department of Justice filed twelve voting discrimination suits in Alabama, 22 in Mississippi, and fourteen in Louisiana, all of which resulted
in findings of discrimination by either the district court or the court of appeals. H.R.
REP. No. 489, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965).
122

1956 Black
Registration
Number
Alabama
Louisiana
Mississippi
Eleven
Southern
States

Per Cent

1965 Black
Registration
Number

1965 White
Registration

Per Cent

Per Cent
69.2g
80.5g
69.9g

73,272
152,587
19,$47

14.Oa
31.7b
3.9c

92,737
164,601
28,500

19.3e
31.6e
6.7e

1,200,000

25.0d

2,174,200

43.3f

Sources:
a 1959 CIvIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 18, at 578 (unofficial 1958 figures).
b Id. at 569 (official 1956 figures).
o Id. at 580 (official 1956 figures).
d Id. at 40.
e US. COMW'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 222 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as POLrcA.L PARTICIPATION].
f US. COMM'N ON CvrL RIGHTs, Tin VOTING RIG-Ts ACT: THE FIasr MONTHS 8 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as THE FIRsT MONTHs].
g POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra, at 227-46.
123 White attorneys in northeast Louisiana discount the influence of informal discussions
with federal judges. Interviews with northeast Louisiana attorneys, Oct. 26 & 28, 1970.
124 Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71. Charles Hamilton recounts a
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As a second objective, Government attorneys hoped to provide the
black community with vital information. Referring to the Ward trial,
one attorney stated:
I got the registrar on the stand and the galleries were packed
with Negro leaders in the county. So I asked her questions for
the benefit of the Negroes. Questions like: Now what are
your office hours? What days are you in your office? Now just
what do you require of persons who come to make application
to register? And the Negroes are sitting right there and they
leave the courtroom armed with all that information. Plus,
you see, I purposely ask the registrar if she intends to register
all persons who come in and who are qualified.
Now we just recently tried that case before Judge Dawkins
and he is nowhere near a decision, but the next week seventy
Negroes were registered. I expect they'll get 1000 Negroes
registered in that Parish and it won't make
much difference
125
what sort of ruling we get from Dawkins.
While black registration did not approach this optimistic prediction,
the actions of community leaders acknowledge the efficacy of such trial
technique. As soon as the trial was completed, and before the Registrar's
books had arrived from the federal courthouse in Monroe, black residents appeared at Miss Ward's office to apply for certification. 126
Additionally, a not wholly unintended benefit developed from this
trial process:
When the suit was called up Wyche and four or five others
were on the stand. Everyone listening to our story and writing
it down. Miss Ward was called, also. And she found she was
the only one involved. All the lawyers in town were there to
watch but they couldn't help her. She just sat there, looking
around, with no one to answer the questions but her.12 7
A civil rights attorney who had handled Madison Parish voting suits
observed that when black leaders reminisce about the early stages of
their struggle,
[o]ne of the things they repeat over and over again is how great
it felt to see the registrar without anyone to protect her. Also,
I think the psychological lift of showing the sheriff to dissimilar observation by Department of Justice attorneys interviewed in early 1963. Hamilton, Southern Judges and Negro Voting Rights: The Judicial Approach to the Solution of
ControversialSocial Problems, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 79, 91.
125 Hamilton, supra note 124, at 97.
126 When permitted to apply, black resident Joe Neal registered first, followed by Wyche
and Brown. Interview with Moses Williams, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 27, 1970.
127 Brown Interview, supra note 118.
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advantage gave many of the less activist Negroes the courage
to register once the trial ended. After all that time and after
all the misery those [white] people dished out, having their
vulnerability revealed probably bothered them more than the
128
knowledge that Negroes would register and vote.
However, these subsidiary benefits neither outweighed the futility of
judicially policing the voting process nor blurred recognition that federally sanctioned litigation produced the same frustrations as those arising
from out-of-court negotiation and private suits. To thwart state-supported disfranchisement required additional legislation which would
not only withdraw all discretion from white registrars but also provide
efficient enforcement mechanisms against post-registration discrimina129
tion by local officials.
III. POST-VOTING

RIGHTS

ACT

LITIGATION

The Voting Rights Act of 1965130 provided three enforcement mechanisms against continuing deprivation of the franchise. First, Congress
provided an alternative to enforcement through litigation by developing a plan under which the Department of Justice could automatically
suspend literacy tests and similar discriminatory devices.' 31 These provisions, which are the only mandatory, administrative remedies under
128 Interviews with attorneys from the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee, in
New Orleans, La., Oct. 23, 1970 [hereinafter cited as LCDC Interviews].
129 Compare the statement of Justice Holmes in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488

(1903):
The bill imports that the great mass of the white population intends to keep the
blacks from voting. To meet such an intent something more than ordering the
plaintiff's name to be inscribed on the [registration] lists ...will be needed. If
the conspiracy and the intent exist, a name on a piece of paper will not defeat
them. Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of
the court, it seems to us that all the plaintiff could get from equity would be an
empty form.
130 79 Stat. 437 (1965) 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (Supp. V, 1965-69). Several authors have
noted the historical precedents to the Voting Rights Act in previous civil rights legislation,
Christopher, supra note 40, at 2 nn.6-11, and have detailed its provisions, see id. at 9-15;
Note, supra note 53, at 1195-1204; Statute Note, 44 TEx. L. REv. 1411 (1966).
131 In any state or political subdivision in which fewer than 50% of the eligible voters
had been registered or had voted in the 1964 presidential election, suspension was automatic. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (Supp. V, 1965-69). The legislation provided an opportunity
for the state to rebut the presumption of discrimination through a declaratory judgment
proceeding, id. at § 1973b(a), but a judicial finding of voting rights denial through racially
discriminatory tests concluded the issue until five years after final judgment, id., whether
entered prior or subsequent to statutory enactment. See United States v. Ward, 352 F.2d
329 (5th Cir. 1965). Additionally, following suspension no new tests or devices could be
adopted unless approved by the Attorney General or by the District Court for the
District of Columbia in a declaratory judgment proceeding. Id. at § 1973c; see Allen v.
Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), holding inter alia that private parties have standing
to seek a declaratory judgment that a new state statute is subject to the § 1973c procedure
and that such coverage questions may be brought in local district courts since they do
not determine the substantive discriminatory effects of new state enactments.
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the Act, withdrew from the district courts discretion to enforce federal
law and to impose available sanctions. Additionally, the coverage
formula eliminated the need for county-by-county litigation, the concomitant search for aggrieved parties, and the exhaustive preparation
required under earlier voting rights legislation.

Although automatic suspension removed locally enforced barriers to
registration, Congress did not trust county officials to comply voluntarily and to register blacks without delay. The legislation's second
enforcement mechanism prevented dilatory tactics by providing the
Attorney General with discretionary power to appoint federal examiners to any political subdivision designated under the automatic suspension sections. 132 To insure that individuals once registered would
be permitted to cast their ballots, Congress authorized the Attorney
General to assign federal observers to oversee elections within any political subdivision designated an "examiner county."'133 This provision,
like that mandating examiner appointments, differed in kind from the
voting referee approach of the 1960 Act in that authority to exercise
discretion was vested in the Attorney General rather than in the vari134
ous district judges.
Finally, Congress proscribed voting-oriented intimidation, threats,
and coercion by both private individuals and those acting under color
of law. 1 5 To enforce these provisions, the Act authorized both criminal
sanctions' 36 and preventive, civil actions, which included specific power
to request a court order directing state or local election officials to
137
permit listed persons to vote and to count their ballots.
132 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a(a), 1973g (challenging listings), 1973k (termination of listing
process) (Supp. V, 1965-69). The examiner could not register individuals but could certify
voter eligibility. On the duty of state officers to accept federal "listing," see Reynolds v.
Katzenbach, 248 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Ala. 1965).
33 42 U.S.C. § 1973f (Supp. V, 1965-69). See also United States v. Executive Comm.,
254 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ala. 1966).
134 Initially, the Department of Justice designated several counties as requiring an
examiner merely to trigger the right to appoint observers. POUTICAL PARTICipAToN, supra
note 122, at 159. This was the case, for example, in Madison Parish, where incidents of
harassment reported by blacks prompted the Department to appoint observers on August
12, 1966, one day prior to a Democratic primary. For the United States Commission on
Civil Rights' discussion of the observer program, see id. at 157-62 & nn. 23-26.
135 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b) (Supp. V, 1965-69).
136 Id. at § 1973j. Note that the definitions of these crimes do not require purpose to
render these acts criminal. Criminal contempt is provided for in id. at § 19731(a).
137 Id. at § 1973j(d). To expedite judicial determinations, Congress eliminated the
exhaustion requirement for federal district court jurisdiction, id. at § 1973j(f), and
authorized examiners to receive and substantiate complaints from listed and eligible
persons who alleged within 48 hours after the polls dosed that they had not been
permitted to vote. If the Attorney General agrees that the complaint is well founded, he
can apply to the federal district court for an order requiring the individual's ballot to
be cast and counted before final certification of election results. The district court must
hear and determine such applications immediately. Id. at § 1973j(e).
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Measured as a means to register blacks, the shift from litigation to
administrative procedures has achieved commendable results. In Madison Parish, for example, 1,819 voting-age blacks registered between
August 7 and September 29, 1965,138 and by October, 1967, black

registration reached 3,862 voters or 74.5 per cent of eligible black citizens.139 Concomitantly, local registrars in the nonexaminer counties of
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina placed
more than 110 000 blacks on the books during the first few weeks after
passage of the Act. 140 Throughout the South, registrars and federal
examiners together brought black registration to 2,810,763 or 57.2 per
cent.141
138 Additionally, during this period 49 whites were accepted and three blacks rejected.
THE FIRST MONTHS, supra note 122, at 62; POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 122, at 240-

41.
139

Madison Parish was not designated an examiner county at this time.

140 THE

FnSr

MONTHS,

supra note 122, at 2. The first black to receive a certificate

under the Voting Rights Act resided in Selma, Alabama. Mrs. Ardies Maulden was
described as "typical of thousands of black people across the Deep South." Neither

a civil rights leader, militant, nor activist, she was "simply an Alabama woman who feels
she is entitled to the right to vote the same as anyone else." Hearings on H.R. 4249, H.R.
5538 and Similar ProposalsBefore Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 3, at 192 (1969) (statement of Vernon E. Jordan, Director, Voter
Education Project).
141 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 122, at 222. The comparable figure for whites
is 14,750,811 or 76.5%. During congressional hearings to amend the Voting Rights Act (the
automatic suspension provisions, among others, would have terminated on August 6, 1970,
absent renewal), it was estimated that 800,000 blacks had been given the opportunity to
register as a result of the Act. See HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 661-2 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings]. Despite this marked increase in registration, critics have contended that the Government refused to utilize fully the examiner provision. PoLrrcAL
PARTICIPATioN, supra note 122, at 153. See also P. WAT'rRs & R. CLEGHORN, CLIMBING
JAcoB's LADDER 245-47, 259-65 (1967). But see R. CLAUDE, Tim SUPRE E COURT AND THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS 13543 (1970). Arguing that, as a minimum, examiners were required
in every county in which a judicial determination of discrimination had been made,
observers rejected the Government theory that voter registration drives would have more
impact locally than would the presence of examiners.
It is impossible to determine why local registrars in some areas performed their
duties voluntarily, albeit grudgingly, while other officials refused to comply. However, a
comparison of Madison and East Carroll Parishes indicates that failure by the Attorney
General to exercise discretion through blanket appointments of examiners did not
necessarily impede registration progress. The Attorney General designated examiners for
East Carroll on August 9 (nonwhite voting-age population 4,183). Tim FIRST MONTHS,
supra note 122, at 50. By September 29, only 33 blacks had been registered there, id. at
61, while in Madison Parish the local registrar had enrolled 1,819 blacks (nonwhite voting-age population 5,181), id. at 62. This initial imbalance abated, however, and on

November 25, 2,647 blacks were on the rolls in East Carroll, compared with 2,036 in
Madison Parish. Letter from Attorney General Katzenbach to Stephen Currier, Nov.
21, 1965. Since the Fifth Circuit's modification of Ward did not issue until October 21,

1965, voluntary compliance cannot have been caused by the court's decree, which included
changes suggested by the Government "to eliminate any possible doubt as to the
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However, Congress designed the Voting Rights Act not only to secure
registration 142 but also to facilitate enforcement of the constitutional
right to vote in its entirety. 143 Although the coverage formula protects
against threshhold discrimination through denial of registration, the
Act fails to extend automatic, administrative protection to every stage
in the electoral process. Moreover, the success of administrative sanctions depends upon strong executive pressure. Absent persistent enforcement, local officials will create increasingly subtle barriers to
formal political participation, thereby increasing the situations which
require judicial intervention. Accordingly, emphasis has shifted from
denial of the vote to dilution of its effectiveness through discriminatory
manipulation of election procedures, and the need for litigation has
not diminished. 144
In comparing recent litigation to that undertaken prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act, two familiar problems appear. First,
judicial reluctance to invoke available sanctions substantially undercuts
the value of adjudicated relief. Second, delayed compliance with congressional mandates burdens the court with continuous, repetitious
litigation. However, post-1965 legal actions also present interesting
contrasts to the registration suits. Reluctance to utilize available sanctions is no longer limited to the judiciary. Government policy repudiates the mandatory provisions of section 5145 and eschews the initiaRegistrar's duty to process each applicant as expeditiously on the day he appears as
possible." 352 F.2d 329 at 331.
142 Southern reaction to unilateral displacement of state voting requirements is well
presented in Brief for Louisiana as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966):
Instead of carefully weeding out the remnants of resistance to the Fifteenth
Amendment, Congress has been shooting from the hip with all sorts of trigger
clauses which leave gaping holes in State statutes, however fairly they are administered. . . . There is no good reason for Congress to start a whole prairie
fire and burn up State statutes wholesale to kill the few remaining weeds of
discrimination still surviving in the South.
143 Many legislators recognized that the Act might prove inadequate to the task. See
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2483 (1965) (statement of Congressman
Lindsay); accord,Senate Hearings,supranote 141, at 9-11 (statement of Senator Mathias); cf.
18 U.S.C. § 245 (Supp. V. 1965-69). However, the dominant trend of thought supported the
predictions that the Act would make the fifteenth amendment "a real part of the United
States Constitution" and that "much of the turmoil over the rights of citizens to participate in this basic governmental function will now be eliminated." Tuttle, Equality and
the Vote, supra note 110, at 263. But see Judge Wisdom's pre-enactment prediction in
United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99, 108 (5th Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion):
If Congress should adopt the proposed Voting Rights Act of 1965, that law too
will change many local customs and further exacerbate state federal functions....
I cannot see into the unknown. But the dark realities of the past militate against
the Court's taking a rosy, relaxed view of the future.
144 See PorITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 122, at 162-67.
145 During the Congressional hearings to extend those provisions of the Voting Rights
Act due to expire, Attorney General Mitchell submitted the Nixon Administration's
proposal to eliminate the prior approval procedure (in favor of a plan which would
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tion of legal proceedings. 146 Abdication of executive responsibility for
preventing discrimination in voting has therefore forced private attorneys to institute most litigation. Additionally, the delay inherent in
using the courts for enforcement has disillusioned black leaders who
expected simplified access to sanctions and has undermined belief in
the electoral process. The following subsections document the limited
efficacy of the Voting Rights Act by examining the new resistance'47
and by analyzing the Madison Parish litigation necessary to redress
continued voting rights infringement.
A.

Brown v. Post' 48 (Post I)

One year after the Voting Rights Act suspended registration requirements,'149 Harrison Brown successfully sustained a Democratic primary
challenge against the white incumbent' 50 for a seat on the school
board.' 8 ' Although the black community had assumed that the Norender new voting provisions ineffective only after a successful action brought in a local
federal court). Although the House accepted the proposal, the Senate did not, and a
simple five-year extension of all expiring provisions was finally adopted. 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3277 (1970). However, the Department of Justice
has revoked through executive policy what the administration did not succeed in
eliminating through legislation. See Letter from Jerris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, to Howard Glickstein, Staff
Director, United States Commission on Civil Rights, Nov. 12, 1970 (copy on file at The
University of Chicago Law Review). In addition, of thirteen suits challenging new voting
provisions, under § 5 or in other contexts, only six were initiated by the Department of
Justice and of the six only two were instituted in 1970.
146 In 1966, twelve suits were decided pursuant to the Voting Rights Act in which
the United States had either initiated action or had been a party plaintiff. In 1970 the
Department of Justice reported activity in only three suits, one of which is Toney v.
White, Civil No. 15,641 (W.D. La., filed May 4, 1970), discussed in text and notes at
notes 256-92 infra. An indication of the declining importance of voting rights can also
be gleaned from the manpower distribution in the Civil Rights Division: education has
thirty attorneys, employment 27, but voting and public accommodations only thirteen.
Letter from Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, to The University of Chicago
Law Review, Mar. 17, 1971.
147 POLTrncA PARTICIPATION, supra note 122, at 21-131 (systematically documenting the
various techniques utilized throughout the South).
148 279 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La. 1968).
149 The decision in United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1965) issued on
August 11, 1965. However, its terms were superceded by the Voting Rights Act, which
had been signed by President Johnson on August 5. See United States v. Ward, 352 F.2d
329 (5th Cir. 1965).
180 Brown defeated Dorothy Provine in the August 13, 1966 Democratic primary by
1,682 to 1,592 votes. The Attorney General had designated Madison Parish an examiner
county the preceding day and had designated federal observers to oversee the primary
contest, which proceeded without incident. 279 F. Supp. at 61-62 (W.D. La. 1968). Every
subsequent Madison Parish election has been observed.

151 Madison Parish is divided into political subdivisions called wards from which the

single-district school system recruits its board members. Ward 4 includes but is not
coterminous with Tallulah.
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vember 8 general election would be a mere formality, 152 Brown was
defeated by J.T. Fulton, a white write-in candidate who had not campaigned openly 53 and whose 1,891- to 1,622-vote victory included 510
of the 512 absentee ballots counted, all of which had been cast by white
voters. 154
The gravamen of the complaint 55 in Brown v. Post was that Clerk
of Court Jerome C. Post and his deputies intentionally discriminated

against black voters by illegally making absentee ballots available to
ineligible white voters in the general election. 156 Fifteen months after
the contest, Judge Dawkins found that the defendant's administration
of the absentee process, while undertaken in good faith, did discrimi57
nate in fact against blacks, rendering the election invalid.
Post I, the first of three suits challenging the conduct of parish elections, 158 highlights the changing nature of discriminatory practices
152 Since the Republicans had not selected a school board nominee in a primary,
state law forbade designating a Republican candidate on the ballot. LA. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:281 (1969). Proposed constitutional amendments were the only other contested items
in the election.
153 Fulton, who qualified as a write-in candidate on October 4, conducted an intensive
but discreet campaign. Until November 8, the day of the election, no radio announcement appeared and not a single poster or newspaper advertisement apprised voters of
Fulton's candidacy. Brief for Plaintiff at 14. Nor did the Madison Journal inform voters
that the school board seat was in contention. Although the paper had printed news
stories about previous elections, including the August 13 primary, and carried an editorial
commenting on the Ward 4 contest after the general election, Editor William Roundtree
ordered a brief blackout on election news prior to November 8, later explaining: "It is
a policy that I adopted." Brief for Plaintiff at 14 (deposition of William Roundtree).
However, the campaign of white citizens between August 13 and October 8 increased
Ward 4 white registration from 2,101 to 2,329. Figures available from Madison Parish
Registrar of Voters.
'54 279 F. Supp. at 62.
155 Id.
156 On November 16, 1966, the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee had filed a
class action on behalf of Brown and two other qualified electors, requesting that the
Governor be enjoined from certifying the election returns and that Brown be declared
the Ward 4 school board member. Brown v. Post, Civil No. 12471 (W.D. La., filed Nov.
16, 1966). Although on November 9, Brown had protested the election in a letter to
the Department of Justice, the Government took no action until January 9, 1967, when
it brought a similar suit. United States v. Post, Civil No. 12583 (W.D. La., filed Jan.
9, 1967). The delay was attributed to the "more thorough investigation" required before the Government brings suit. Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71. The defendant's answer, filed January 26, 1967, denied the relevant allegations of discrimination and denied the district court's jurisdiction. Additionally, the answer claimed that
defendant Post acted according to state law and did not subject any Madison Parish citizen
to unusual treatment. Brief for Defendant at 4-11.
357 279 F. Supp. at 63. The Brown trial had been held on March 20-22, 1967, and the
opinion was delivered on January 24, 1968. A preliminary injunction issued by Judge
Dawkins on December 5 had prevented the issuance of a commission to any candidate
for school board member.
158 This was also the first parishwide election in which a black candidate ran for
public office or in which a significant number of black voted. See, however, allegations
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following passage of the Voting Rights Act. Specifically, local officials
shifted their tactics from denial of the vote to reduction of its effectiveness. 5 9 The court was therefore required to determine, first, if
dilution, absent a finding of intentionality, constituted a remedial
grievance and, second, what form of relief would most capably protect
the fifteenth amendment's guarantee by insuring full weight to each
ballot.
1. The Discrimination in Effect Standard. In the legislative context, Baker v. Carr60o has established that constitutional protection
extended beyond absolute deprivation of the franchise. While judicial
recognition of violations in electoral integrity had been limited to acts
of fraud""' and circumstances in which racial motivations denied access
to the polling place, 62 in April, 1967 the Fifth Circuit recognized that
acts which on their face are innocent but which in fact promote voting
discrimination violate the fifteenth amendment. 6 3 Post I established
that a conclusion of unconstitutional dilution of the vote does not
depend on a finding of discriminatory purpose.
In adopting the "discrimination in effect" standard, the court rejected strong evidence of intentional misconduct. The defendants had
provided white residents with opportunities to vote absentee without
extending the privilege to similarly situated blacks. Louisiana law
provides that the clerk of court may establish substations to aid absentee voting.' 4 The procedure contemplates public notification and
a permanent site, authorized by the police jury, at which regular hours
are kept.6 5 Nevertheless, substations created by Clerk of Court Post
of discrimination regarding the first local election to be held after the passage of the
Voting Rights Act. POLrncAL PAMCIPATION, supra note 122, at 38-39.
359 See text at notes 186-88 infra.
160 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
161 See, e.g., Wells v. Wallace, 337 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. 1959); In re Dorgan, 44 N.J. 440, 210
A.2d 67 (1965); Ingram v. Burnette, 204 Tenn. 149, 316 S.W.2d 31 (1958).
162 Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966).
163 Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967).
164 LA. Rv.STAT. ANN. § 33:1461 (Supp. 1971).
165 In defining the procedure to be followed with regard to substations, the Louisiana
Attorney General had advised, quoting a February 22, 1958 opinion, that

should you decide, in the exercise of your sound judgment, that a sub-office or
sub-offices should be opened for the purpose of facilitating absentee voting, then
you should direct your request for suitable offices, furniture and equipment, to

the [police jury], and obtain the necessary authority of that governing body to
either purchase or rent a building or buildings, and to obtain the required furniture and equipment.
Brief for Plaintiff at 46. The Attorney General had also advised:

Although the statute is silent as to the days and hours these sub-offices are to
be kept open, we would advise against keeping them open other than during the
regular days and hours for absentee voting. Also, in the interest of fairness in
elections, we advise that you give public notice of your intention to open a
sub-office.
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did not meet these standards. Without notice, a temporary, one-day
office was established at the Scott Plantation, which is located one and
one-half miles from Tallulah and which employed only white field66
hands.1
Nor did fieldworkers' absentee ballots accepted by Post conform to
Louisiana law. The procedure requires a qualified registered voter
who expects to be absent from the parish on the day of a general election to apply between two to ten days before that election to the parish's district court clerk for an official ballot. In applying for his absentee
ballot the voter must swear that he is duly registered and will be
absent from the parish on election day. The applicant then executes
his ballot in secret, seals it, and swears to its authenticity and secrecy.1 67 However, those voting absentee at the plantation uniformly
testified that they had no genuine expectation of being absent from
the parish on election day, that they were not asked if they would
be outside the area, that their affidavits consisted of signing their names,
and that they completed their ballots by marking an X next to the
name of J.T. Fulton, which had already been written in for them.'6
Post repeated this procedure at the all-white Delta Haven Nursing
Home because "[i]n a prior election Senator Brown, who was either a
major stockholder or owner of the rest home called me up and asked
me if these people would be allowed to vote and that they expressed
a desire to vote."'16 9 At this special substation, Deputy Clerk Jewell
Willhite not only helped fill in the ballots, but also informed voters
170
of Fulton's race and status as a write-in candidate.
Inpatients at the all-black Baptist Nursing Home received neither the
opportunity to vote nor the assistance afforded whites in similar circumstances. Rev. Frank Wilson, unsuccessful candidate for Ward 2
school board member, testified:
I asked Mr. Post about bringing in some of the elderly people
to let them sign an absentee ballot before the day of the election. Mr. Post said that I would have to bring them and they
166 Post established the station at the request of Scott Plantation managers.
This was an unusual circumstance and during this period of time the place had
been sold. The employees that worked there were trying very hard to finish the
Scott plantation crop. During the time of absentee balloting they were busy in
the field, as it were. There were a number of them that were anticipating leaving
town. At the same time the majority of them, if the crop was harvested before
the voting date, were to be transferred to another place to work. I felt like it
would expedite matters if he set up a station there rather than have these people
go to town to vote absentee because it would save him and them time, too.
Brief for Plaintiff at 40 (testimony of Mrs. Warren Patrick, wife of part-owner).
167 LA. RP-v. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:1071-:1076 (1969) describe absentee voting procedures.
Brief for Plaintiff at 40-43.
169 Record at 379 (emphasis added).
170 Record at 80 (testimony uncontradicted).
168
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would have to swear an affidavit they would be out of town on
the day of the election. But I said I had no intention of them
being out of town and I thought maybe they could sign an
absentee [ballot] since they were old and couldn't get about,
no, they couldn't do that unless they would be out
but he said,
171
of town.
In addition to providing opportunities for voting absentee at substations, 72 the defendants aided those white citizens who came to the
clerk's office thinking they might like to avoid the polls on November
8 for reasons of personal convenience. Witnesses referred to being
encouraged to vote absentee. While these encouragements were not
attributable to the defendants, their conduct supported an inference
of soliciting absentee ballots. Mrs. M. N. Ingram, who did not expect
to be absent from the parish on election day, voted absentee because
she might not have transportation to the polls on November 8. Mrs.
J. J. Smith, who had never before voted absentee, did so in this election
because she wanted to stay in her store all day. Mr. Roy Erwin was
neither asked if he expected to be absent from the parish nor required
to fill out his own affidavit-one of the clerk's employees did that for
him. Other residents received absentee ballots in the mail without
having requested them. 73 However, when Moses Williams, Brown's
campaign manager, inquired about absentee voting procedures, Post
told him that "one must swear he is to be out of town or have reason
to believe he will be out of town on election day," that "absentee should
be cast in the Clerk's office," and that "it couldn't be cast nowhere but
74
in the Clerk's office."'
Intentional discrimination may also be inferred from the internal
administration of the absentee voting process. Louisiana law provides
that printed instructions for voting absentee be furnished to each
absentee voter.175 These materials include detailed information on
procedures to be followed in executing the ballot in person or by mail,
and a simple statement of the method used to vote for a candidate
whose name does not appear on the ballot. Each absentee voter received
this material from the Clerk of Court's office. However, Deputy Clerk
171 Brief for Plaintiff at 49.
172 In addition to the offices described in the text, Post set up six substations in private
homes in the white Willow Bayou section of Tallulah "without a corresponding opportunity being given to Negroes similarly situated." 279 F. Supp. at 63. The plaintiffs offered

fifteen witnesses to explain the circumstances of their voting absentee at places outside
the Clerk of Court's office. Brief for Plaintiff at 19,46.
173 The plaintiffs offered thirteen witnesses to describe the circumstances surrounding
their use of absentee ballots. Brief for Plaintiff at 19-46.
174 Brief for Plaintiff at 49.

175 LA. R v.STAT. § 18:1074 (Supp. 1964).
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Grace Grimes also enclosed (1) a photocopy of an official ballot on
which she wrote "J.T. Fulton" in the space provided for entering a
candidate's name and (2) instructions telling the voter to "use a lead
pencil containing black lead to mark your ballot, mark it as shown on
the sample ballot enclosed. Mark the white square opposite the name
in the blank column on your ballot."'176 No comparable instruction
guided voters desiring to mark their ballot in favor of Brown or the
constitutional amendments 177
Most incriminating of all, the defendants were unable to offer convincing reasons for having requested one thousand absentee ballots for
the November election. 78s Since fewer than 150 voters had cast absentee
ballots in the August primary, 179 lack of a substantial basis for expecting
such a dramatic increase in absentee voting leads to the conclusion that
the defendants intended to strengthen J. T. Fulton's write-in candidacy
by promoting absentee balloting. 80
Ignoring the issue of intentionality for a moment, the tally of absentee ballots further supports an inference that the conduct of local
officials aided Fulton's write-in campaign. While absentee ballots comprised thirteen per cent of the total votes cast in the election, nearly
27 per cent of the white voters cast absentee ballots. Moreover, Fulton's 169-vote margin of victory contained 26.9 per cent questionable
absentee ballots while Brown's official tally included only two votes
not cast at the polls.' 8 ' Thus Brown, whose supporters took the trouble
to appear in person, trailed by 508 votes before the polls even opened.
176 Brief for Plaintiff at 20.
177 The plaintiffs offered six witnesses to explain the circumstances and procedure for
voting absentee by mail. Brief for Plaintiff at 19-46.
178 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:1072 (1969) requires the Secretary of State to provide
absentee ballots equal to 10% of the registration thirty days prior to election.
179 In the past three Madison Parish elections, fewer than 4% of the voters had cast

absentee ballots. April 9, 1966 Democratic primary: of 3,145 votes cast, 114 absentee.
August 13, 1966 Democratic primary: of 3,509 votes cast, 149 absentee. September 24, 1966
runoff primary: of 2,469 votes cast, 48 absentee. Pre-Trial Stipulation.
180 The justifications offered include Mrs. Grimes' assertion that increased "colored"
registration between April and August necessitated increased ballots, Brief for Plaintiff
at 19 (this rationale appears questionable since only eight blacks had voted absentee in
the August primary), and Clerk of Court Post's testimony that he knew the Ward 4 election to be causing unusual interest which would result in a heavier vote, Record at 17
(this reasoning is similarly suspect since by his own admission Post appears to have requested the additional ballots prior to learning of Fulton's candidacy, id. at 18).
181

Fulton
Brown

Total
Votes Cast

Votes Cast at
Polling Places

Absentee
Votes

Per Cent
Absentee

1,891
1,622

1,881
1,620

510
2

26.94%
0.01%

Source: 279 F. Supp. at 62.
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Despite all this evidence, Judge Dawkins refused to find that the
defendants intentionally granted whites illegal advantage in order to
discriminate against blacks. 1 82 Under this view, the defendants merely
18 3
discriminated in fact by omitting to grant blacks similar privileges.
Hence, no absentee ballots were found to be illegal; 8 4 rather, those
accepted at the substations resulted in a discriminatory effect. Since
giving preferential treatment to one class of voters promotes impermissible racial distinctions, the defendants' motivation became irrelevant. 8 5
With Post I, Judge Dawkins extended the ambit of activities consti8 6 In Bell v. Southwell, 87
tuting effective dilution of the franchise.
where the defendants' "flagrant" and "completely indefensible" conduct included overt discriminatory acts on election day, the court held
that an election tainted by such constitutional violations will be voided
182 Judge Dawkins found, "[c]ontrary to the allegations of the complaint," that:
(a) There is no evidence whatsoever that defendant Post or his deputies obtained
absentee ballots from the Secretary of State for white persons alone, or that the
ballots were obtained to facilitate any particular class of voters. The unusual
amount of interest in this election was known to defendants and therefore they
obtained extra ballots commensurate with this unusual interest.
(b) The name of all persons voting absentee in the subject election were posted
in a conspicuous place in the Clerk's office as provided by law.
(c) No conspiracy by defendants to deprive Negroes of their right to vote has
been shown even in the slightest respect.
(d) There is no affirmative proof that it was the color of any candidate or any
prospective voter which caused defendants to accept any allegedly illegal absentee
votes. There is no basis or justification for the allegation that defendants accepted
irregular absentee ballots from white voters merely because they were white
and would therefore vote for J. T. Fulton because he was the white candidate.
(e) None of the defendants actively campaigned for J. T. Fulton.
Id. at 63.
183 Id. However, the defendants, as clerks of court acting under state law,
had a duty under the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 not to engage in any acts or practices
in the absentee voting process which have the effect of discrimination among
qualified voters in elections of any kind. This duty included refraining from any
conduct which results in allowing white voters opportunities to vote without
affording the same opportunities to Negro voters.
Id. at 64.
184 "The result of the election would not have been different had the final tabulation
not included absentee ballots cast outside the office of the Clerk in violation of Louisiana
law." Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
185 "Reiterating for emphasis, we do not find defendants engaged in any intentional
plan to deprive Negroes of their constitutional right to vote. However, the manner in
which they administered the absentee process was discriminatory in fact." Id. (emphasis
in original).
186 Judge Dawkins did not state that in recognition of a "discriminatory in fact [effect]"
standard he was adding to the theoretical texture of franchise deprivation. His opinion,
composed of sixteen findings of fact and nine conclusions of law, contains no jurisprudential discussion at all.
187 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967). The plaintiffs had alleged two sets of irregularities,
but the court's decision, which technically reversed a grant of summary judgment, treated
only the maintenance of segregated voting lists and polling booths, which the defendants'
answer had admitted. Id. at 664, 665 n.l3.
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even if the plaintiff cannot show they affected the final results. In Post I,
however, Judge Dawkins predicated relief on discriminatory practices
which neither influenced blacks not to appear at the polls nor personally
intimidated individuals by deterring them from voting for black candidates. Therefore, a remedial grievance had been established even if
election day activity was untainted and black voters lacked direct
knowledge of racially motivated unequal conduct on the part of state
officials, provided that the defendants' practices added a new, intervening factor which directly prejudiced the integrity of the entire electoral
process. The plaintiffs could satisfy their burden of proof by demonstrating "discrimination in effect." Concededly, Judge Dawkins' approach may have been motivated by his desire not to characterize the
defendants' acts as intentional. However, plaintiffs' attorneys, who had
strongly argued for a finding of intentionality, recognized that in the
future the "discrimination in effect" standard would be a far simpler
88
one to satisfy1
2. The Voiding Remedy. Having determined that the defendants'
actions constituted a violation of electoral integrity, Judge Dawkins
faced two alternative forms of relief-he could either declare the loser
victorious 8 9 or void the election. 190 Awarding the office to Brown
required vote counting either by determining if Brown would have
188 This point is discussed briefly in McCarty & Stevenson, The Voting Rights Act of
1965: An Evaluation, 3 HA~v. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 357, 402-03 (1968).

189 Assuming that Judge Dawkins would find all absentee votes invalid, the plaintiffs
contended that on the facts as they appeared subsequent to the election, had the
illegally obtained and executed ballots been excluded, Brown would have beaten Fulton
1,620 to 1,381. There is an obvious danger to this line of reasoning-it denies the franchise
to possibly innocent victims of official misconduct, including the victorious candidate.
First, an undetermined number of absentee ballots were legally obtained and executed.
Should these not have been counted, some white voters would have been denied their
right to vote because of action to which they did not contribute and of which they had
no knowledge. Second, of those who cast absentee ballots, a percentage did not intend
to act illegally and relied on the defendant's statements and procedures by virtue of his
office. Had they not believed themselves to be eligible to cast absentee ballots, they might
have personally voted at the polls on November 8.
190 While courts have traditionally refrained from interfering with the electoral
process by voiding or enjoining elections, following the Voting Rights Act district courts
have set elections aside under extraordinary circumstances in which plaintiffs have diligently pressed their claims so as to avoid unnecessary disruption of governmental processes.
Hiamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966). But see McGill v. Ryals, 253 F. Supp.
874 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge panel) (denying declaratory relief to plaintiffs who
sought to have Lowndes County offices declared vacant on the ground that an array of
past constitutional violations had collectively denied blacks the right to vote and enabled
a white minority to seize political power); accord, Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
v. Democratic Party, 362 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1966) (denying a request to enjoin state primary
elections for four months to permit additional registration which would compensate for
one hundred years of racial discrimination); cf. Hamer'v. Ely, 410 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969)
(involving the election ordered in Hamer); Gray v. Main, 309 F. Supp. 207 (MD. Ala. 1968).
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beaten Fulton had a certain number of "white votes" been rejected, or
by adding to Brown's tally the hypothetical number of votes he could
have secured at the Baptist Nursing Home and substations set up on
plantations employing black fieldhands. Having refused to recognize
the illegality of any absentee ballot, Judge Dawkins precluded any
attempt at a vote count. Therefore, the question that ultimately con11
fronted him was whether to void the election. '
Judge Dawkins followed Bell v. Southwel1 92 and recognized the
defendants' offense to be against the election itself as a constitutionally
guaranteed process. The plaintiffs, having shown a discriminatory
effect and having seasonably filed their complaint one week following
the contest, were entitled to relief. The decree ordered a special election between Brown and Fulton to be held within ninety days. Additionally, Judge Dawkins ordered the defendants not to engage in the
practices which had caused invalidation of the first election or in any
other practices discriminatory in fact. 19 3
Although plaintiffs' attorneys had anticipated a more stringent decree condemning the defendants' conduct, at this point they were willing to exchange restraint in applying judicial sanctions for the more
flexible "discriminatory in effect" standard which would support future
applications to void elections. Additionally, the general portion of
Judge Dawkins' order enjoining any acts discriminatory in effect appeared a sufficient basis for invoking the court's contempt power should
Post or the other defendants again disturb the election process.
The subsequent history of Brown indicates, however, that the voiding
remedy does not erase all barriers to effective relief and further suggests
191 The two factors which underlie the courts' granting of voiding relief are timing
and the intervening event test. Even if plaintiffs have filed timely objections, courts
appear to have determined as a matter of policy not to interfere as long as the spirit of
current legal standards is being met. The reward for acquiesence is thus judicial restraint should blacks request additional sanctions. See cases cited note 190 supra. For
example, in Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and McGill, the plaintiffs desired
to catch up in the political process although no new official action impeded their progress.
They argued that accumulated past wrongs depriving them of the right to vote entitled their
class to preferential treatment, including the opportunity to time an election. In Hamer,
on the other hand, an additional causative factor intruded to affirmatively retard the

effects of judicially granted freezing relief. Using state residency and poll tax payment
laws, local officials sought to continue the condemned policy of disfranchising blacks. Cf.
United States v. Democratic Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 943 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Smith
v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala 1966), modified, 886 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967).
192 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967). Although Hamer v. Campbell, 385 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.
1966), had implicitly rejected the "affecting outcome" approach (only 1.1% of eligible
blacks were registered compared with 80% of eligible whites), Bell, handed down April
14, 1967, was the first case to so hold when pre-election relief had not been requested.
193 279 F. Supp. at 64.
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that the plaintiffs misconstrued the reach of Judge Dawkins' order.'"
A purge of registered voters marred the conduct of the special election
held on April 9, 1968.15 Judge Dawkins had issued specific orders respecting voter eligibility: 196
[T]he voters eligible to vote in the special election between
J. T. Fulton, as a write-in candidate, and Harrison H. Brown,
as Democratic nominee, shall be the same as those eligible to
vote in the general election held on November 8, 1966, as
19 7
determined by the eligible voters list used in that election.
However, Registrar Myrtis Bishop' 9s issued instructions to the voting
commissioners that 271 black voters and 208 white voters who were
eligible to vote in the general election would not be permitted to
vote in the reelection. The commissioners followed these instructions,
which were based on a purge of voters undertaken subsequent to the
November 8 election, and did not permit the named individuals to
vote on April 9 whether or not they had reregistered. 199 With the
purge in effect, Fulton again defeated Brown, by 1,579 to 1,510 votes.
The Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee (LCDC) filed a civil
contempt motion against Mrs. Bishop,200 alleging that violation of the
court order may have altered the April 9 election results201 and request194 Compare the plaintiffs' experience while awaiting Judge Dawkins' determination in
Post L On October 11, 1967, plaintiffs' counsel requested a further preliminary injunction
amending the December 5, 1966 order. The plaintiffs filed in advance of the Democratic primary scheduled for November 4, 1967, in which seven black candidates were running for office, to avoid the litigation and uncertainty that resulted from the 1966 school board election. However, Judge Dawkins denied relief because the issue was not decided, thus rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that the facts in Post I were undisputed and that the
only determination for the court was the application of federal law.
'95 The defendants filed a motion to stay on February 15, which was denied, and a

notice of appeal on February 20, but Judge Dawkins ordered the reenactment of the
general election held as scheduled on April 9, 1968.
190 The order followed by one day a request for clarification of the January 4 decree.
Letter from Louisiana Attorney General Jack Gremillion to Judge Dawkins, Feb. 13,
1968. On February 8, 1968, a general election had been held under questionable circumstances. See text and notes at notes 208-54 infra. The Attorney General apparently desired
to avoid a challenge to the special election.
197 In addition, Judge Dawkins instructed his clerk to advise all counsel "that the
Board of Election Commissioners shall conduct this election, as to the write in candidate
in full accordance with Louisiana Law as applicable on 11/8/66." Information on file at
the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee.
198 Katherine Ward had resigned as of January 1, 1966.
199 Complaint at 2.
200 This motion, filed on April 24, was predicated on the January

4 decree
enjoining the defendants from engaging in "practices and procedures which may be discriminatory" and on the February 14 eligibility order.
201 Complaint at 2. The Registrar found 2,389 blacks and 2,121 whites eligible to vote
on April 9. Figures available from Madison Parish Registrar of Voters. This special election is the only contest before 1970 in which black registration fell below that of whites.
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ing that the 479 purged persons be permitted to cast their ballots
within thirty days of entering the order.20 2 Three affidavits supported
the complaint.
No hearing on the contempt proceeding was held.20 3 On August 21,

the defendants filed a motion to vacate past injunctive relief and to
require the governor to give Fulton his commission. Citing the civil
contempt motion, the plaintiffs rejected the contention that "no proceedings have been filed herein contesting the result" of the special
election. However, they decided to abandon the contempt proceeding
because of insufficiency of proof.2

4

Accordingly, the plaintiffs did not

contest that part of the defendant's motion to vacate that injunctive
relief which prevented certification of the election of Fulton, but they
did oppose the vacation of any permanent injunctive relief previously
entered by the court.
The rationale offered by plaintiffs' attorneys for deciding to abandon
the civil contempt proceeding is difficult to accept in light of the affidavits submitted with the complaint. Rather, it seems that the attorneys
decided not to antagonize Judge Dawkins by requesting him to find a
Madison Parish white official in civil contempt.2 0 5 By this time, the
February 6 special election in which Republican Clayton Cox defeated
Zelma C. Wyche for village marshal was being contested. 20 6 When balanced against the remote possibility that counting purged persons' votes
would reverse the April 9 results, the psychological importance of
electing a chief of police and the greater influence of the office in the
power hierarchy argued against continuing the contempt proceedings.
Given the Judge's reluctance to find intentionality and his manipulation of the "discriminatory in effect" concept, such pressure could
202 Following this voting, the Board of Supervisors would add the additional ballots to
the recorded tally and send the recompiled returns to the Secretary of State so that he
could proclaim the winner and rescind any prior proclamation on the subject. Complaint
at 2-3. For a discussion of the various bases of the purges, all of which were utilized by
Registrar Bishop, see text and notes at notes 261-77 infra.
203 A May 8 hearing on the contempt motion was cancelled (attorneys involved do not
remember why). Subsequently, counsel informed the court that defendants wished to
abandon their as yet undocketed appeal of the decision and order in Post 1. Information
on file at the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee.
204 Letter from Richard Sobol, plaintiff's attorney, to The University of Chicago Law
Review, Jan. 6, 1971. Although deterred from continuing the contempt proceeding, plaintiff's attorneys pressed Judge Dawkins to approve the bill of costs submitted following the
January 4 opinion. After a year's delay, Judge Dawkins ordered Post to pay costs of
$1,623.33 to the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee. This reimbursement has
not yet been received. Information on file at the Lawyers Constitutional Defense
Committee.
205 Similar difficulties with contempt actions have occurred in other district courts.
See the history detailed in United States v. Lynd, 349 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1965).

208 See text and notes at notes 209-55 infra.
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severely prejudice the second voiding case. This apprehension no doubt
influenced plaintiffs' attorneys not to request Judge Dawkins to void
the special election and contributed to the Department of Justice's decision not to invoke section 1973j of the Voting Rights Act, which would
20 7
have permitted collection and tallying of illegally excluded votes
and, additionally, would have provided a speedy resolution of the
election challenge while still permitting the civil contempt proceeding
to continue.
On September 8, Judge Dawkins granted the motion to vacate all
injunctive relief, indicating that his general order not to engage in
practices "discriminatory in fact" had been designed to cover only
activities incident to the special election and not, as the plaintiffs had
assumed, all future electoral conduct of defendants. Thus, after two
years of litigation and a judicial determination that fifteenth amendment rights had been violated, no local official remained bound by
court order not to discriminate and Fulton assumed Mrs. Provine's
Ward 4 school board seat on the strength of a questioned 69-vote
majority.
B.

United States v. Post2s (Post II)
The conduct of local officials during the February 6, 1968 special
election, 20 9 in which Cox defeated Wyche for village marshal, 210 demonstrates the complete failure of Post I to deter future acts of discrim211
ination. Only three weeks after an injunction was issued against him,
Clerk of Court Post helped institute last-minute changes in election
procedures which again discriminated against black voters. In United
States v. Post, moreover, the evidence of the defendants' 212 intent to
207 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(e) (Supp. V, 1965-69). It is arguable that when examiners are
not present in the county, federal observers or Department of Justice attorneys could perform the function of receiving and substantiating complaints.
208

297 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. La. 1969).

209 The death of the incumbent before his term expired necessitated special elections,

which were joined with the Democratic primary of November 4, 1967 and the general
election of February 6, 1968.
210 Wyche had defeated two white candidates in the special Democratic primary while
Cox received the Republican nomination, after being appointed to fill the marshal's
seat on a temporary basis. Cox won the election in question by a margin of 1,954 votes
to Wyche's 1,659. Brief for Plaintiff Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee at 14
[hereinafter cited as LCDC Briefj.
211 See text at note 249 infra. Judge Dawkins issued his opinion in Brown v. Post on
January 4, 1968. Post's involvement in the present case dates from January 24, 1968, when
he urged officials to adopt the lockout in Ward 4. See text at note 231 infra.
212 Although Post was the principal defendant, suit was also brought against F.M.
Magee, a voting machine mechanic; Douglas Fowler, State Custodian of Voting Machines;
Wade Martin, Secretary of State; and Jack H. Folk, J.W. -Huckabay, and Myrtis Bishop,
members of the Board of Supervisors. On February 23 and 26, 1968, respectively, the
Government and LCDC filed complaints under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973a, 1971(a), 1971(c),
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discriminate appears even stronger than in Post L The fundamental
significance of Post II, therefore, lies in the response of both the plaintiffs' attorneys and the trial judge to repeated infringement of voting
rights. Despite convincing evidence that the defendants sought to defeat Wyche, the Department of Justice and LODO chose not to press
for a finding of intentional discrimination or to seek punitive measures
that would deter future misconduct. Rather, the attorneys acknowledged Judge Dawkins' tendency to impose minimal sanctions and limited their requested relief to an order setting aside the election. Judge
Dawkins, in turn, fashioned a politically adroit compromise, giving the
plaintiffs the new election they clearly deserved while expressly exonerating the defendants.
1. Discrimination Through Adjustment of Voting Machines. The
central issue in Post II is the decision to disconnect the master party
lever from the marshal's race, thereby requiring Tallulah residents to
pull the individual lever above the candidate's name in order to vote
for town marshal.
Post convinced his superiors to adopt this procedure 213 after the
Secretary of State's office mistakenly listed the marshal's race on all
Ward 4 ballots. The officials involved did not realize that Ward 4 is
comprised of areas inside and outside Tallulah boundaries. 214 As
printed, the ballot would permit ineligible voters-those residing outside the village boundaries-to vote in the special election for village
marshal.21 5 To remedy this situation, state officials considered several
options(l but decided to disconnect the marshal's election from the
master level in all Ward 4 voting machines. Election supervisors
could prevent out-of-town voters from casting ballots in the marshal's
race by using a "lockout" switch to freeze the individual levers in
place.2 1 7 Accordingly, Tallulah voters could vote for marshal only by

pulling the individual lever above the candidate's name.
and § 12(d) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These actions were subsequently consolidated for trial.
213 As Clerk of Court for the Sixth Judicial District of Louisiana, Post was ex officio
custodian of parish voting machines.
214 Ward 4 contains seven precincts. Three precincts contain only Tallulah voters, while
the remaining four contain voters living within and without the village limits.
215 The ballot indicated, moreover, that pulling the master lever would register a vote
for all 24 offices, including village marshal, the last one listed.
216 See text at notes 228-29 infra.
217 Because of the mechanical limitations of the voting machines, however, the lockout
switch could be used only on individual levers that were disconnected from the master
party lever. 297 F Supp. at 48. In the special primary of November 4, the marshal's
race appeared on all ballots in Ward 4. A primary, however, does not involve straight
party voting or the use of the master party lever. It is always necessary to pull the individual candidate's lever in order to vote in a particular race. Hence, no problem arose
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Post, however, did not announce the change in procedure, either to
the general public or to the candidates involved. 21 8 On election day,
precinct officials under his supervision failed to inform several hundred
black voters of the need to pull the individual lever in the marshal's
race.21 9 Moreover, printed instructions inside the voting machines also
indicated that the master party lever would cast votes for all party
candidates. 220 The election therefore proceeded in a state of confusion,
with an indeterminate number of voters mistakenly pulling the master
lever to vote for marshal.
While the decision to adjust the machines does not by itself seem
racially motivated, a discriminatory purpose nevertheless appears from
the selection of a highly prejudicial procedure and from the unaccountable failure to inform either the public or the candidates of the
major change. First, the requirement of separate voting in the marshal's
contest discriminated solely against Wyche, since he alone based his
entire campaign on urging voters to pull the Democratic master lever. 22 '
when election officials froze the marshal's levers as voters living outside Tallulah entered
the booth.
218 The only form of public notice was the posting of a revised sample ballot outside
the Clerk of Court's office indicating the need to pull the individual lever in the marshal's
race. The revised ballot replaced the first sample ballot, which did not indicate the need
to pull the individual lever. 297 F. Supp. at 49.
219 As the polls opened, commissioners in Precincts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 did not mention
the necessity of pulling the individual lever, according to the testimony of federal observers. Record at 114-15, 121, 132, 152-54, 162. No information in the record concerned
the remaining precincts 1 and 7, which were all-white. LCDC Brief at 13. At approximately
6:45 a.m., Wyche discovered that the master lever would not cast a vote in the marshal's
race. When Robert Moore, a Department of Justice attorney supervising federal observers, learned of this situation, he protested the failure of election commissioners to offer
the necessary information. Id. at 12. Thereafter, Jack Folk and Post went to all voting
precincts and instructed the commissioners to advise each voter to pull the individual lever
to vote for marshal. Accordingly, the correct information was generally offered, except in
Precinct 4 where four white commissioners still did not volunteer the instructions. Record
at 137-38. The plaintiffs estimated that more than three hundred black voters failed to
receive the proper information, and therefore did not cast a vote for marshal that actually
registered, although intending to do so. LCDC Brief at 13-14.
220 "To Vote STRAIGHT TICKET Turn Large Handle by Emblem to Right. This
Marks X's for all Party Candidates but NOT for AMENDMENTS. To Vote AMENDMENTS Turn Each Pointer SEPARATELY." LCDC Brief at 12.
221 Wyche distributed three thousand campaign cards with the slogan "PULL THE
LEVER WITH THE ROOSTER. Vote the Straight Democratic Ticket." (The Rooster is
the emblem of the Democratic Party in Louisiana and is pictured next to the master party
lever on the ballot.) On local radio, he made ninety announcements to promote the straight
ticket, while the Voters League distributed a standard Democratic Party campaign leaflet
which told people to "Vote [for] the straight MCKIETHEN-AYCOCK-PARKER TICKET
and for all other Democratic Nominees" by pulling the party lever next to the rooster.
Wyche's supporters also displayed 275 bumper stickers with his name printed beside a
prominent picture of the rooster. Other campaign materials included handbills and
leaflets, both of which emphasized the straight party ticket. Record at 15-25; LCDC Brief
at 4-5.
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The comparatively large number of illiterate voters in Tallulah, the
majority of whom are black, made such a strategy advisable. These
individuals invariably have difficulty in operating a voting machine
correctly. 222 Hence Wyche's campaign slogan, "Pull the lever with the
Rooster," gave his supporters a tangible symbol to associate with his
name and reduced the possibility of pulling the wrong lever. The use
of voting machines, moreover, constituted a relatively new experience
for the black community as a whole. Turning the master lever would
simplify the procedure of voting for Wyche, who was listed on the ballot
beside 23 other Democrats.
Cox, in contrast, could not have been affected by the lockout. His
campaign consisted simply of asking his supporters to pull the individual lever above his name.2 23 Since he was one of only two Republican candidates, he did not expect the traditionally Democratic voters
224
of Madison Parish to pull the Republican master lever.
In addition to being discriminatory, the procedure used by the defendants was unnecessarily misleading. Electors accustomed to voting
a straight party ticket had no reason to assume that the master lever
would record votes for only 23 of the 24 candidates listed on the ticket.225 Louisiana law in fact requires that the voters be able to cast
a straight party ticket in all general elections. 226 Arguably, these provisions also apply to special elections that are joined to general elec7
tions.22
222 Although illiterates are entitled to seek assistance in operating voting machines,
many decline to do so, either out of pride, embarrassment, or unwillingness to let third
persons witness their vote. See United States v. Louisiana, 265 F. Supp. 708, 715 (E.D. La.
1966), aff'd, 886 U.S. 270 (1967) (interpreting a Louisiana statute to require assistance to
illiterate voters on request).
223 Brief for Plaintiff United States Department of Justice at 11. [hereinafter cited as
Government Brief].
224 White Madison Parish residents ordinarily vote Democratic in state and local
elections-as long as a black candidate has not won the primary. See, e.g., STATE OF
LoUISIANA, GENM.AL ELErION RrtruRs, NovLNrasm 5, 1968, at 56 (1968).

225 See text at notes 286-41 infra.
226 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:1168 (1969) provides:

Any voting machine may be leased, borrowed, or purchased and used which is
so constructed as to fulfill the following requirements ....
(8) It shall permit the voter to vote for the candidates of one party as a unit at
general elections.
LA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 15, provides:
All elections by the people, except primary elections, ... shall be by official
ballot . . . [which shall have] a specific and separate device adopted by [a] political party ....
By stamping such device at the head of the list of the candi-

dates of each political party, or nominating party, the voter may indicate that his
vote is for the entire or straight ticket of the particular party. ....
This provision has been incorporated into statute in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:671 (1969).
227 The voting machine mechanic, however, believed that the special election did
not require connection with the master lever. 297 F. Supp. at 48-49.
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Significantly, the defendants rejected three administratively feasible
alternatives which were nondiscriminatory and straightforward. New
ballots could have been printed, listing the marshal's race separately
from the 23 other offices.228 This procedure would have clarified the
special nature of the election and apprised voters that the party lever
would not operate in the marshal's race. Additionally, separate machines could have been set up for the different classes of residents since
the marshal's race would be locked out on nonresidents' machines.
Finally, new ballots could have been used in which the marshal's race
229
would be listed for Tallulah voters only.
Although the defendants denied any discriminatory purpose, they
could not convincingly explain their choice of the most confusing procedure. An administrative assistant to the Secretary of State made the
final decision on the basis of a January 24 telephone discussion with
Post, who claimed to have already instructed election commissioners
in the use of the lockout.230 Post urged retention of that procedure
because it would be difficult to get the commissioners to attend another
meeting.231 However, the strength of this justification is undercut by
the testimony that Post never informed commissioners of the need to
pull the separate lever 23 2 and by the subsequent failure of commissioners to instruct voters as to the proper means to cast a ballot for
marshal.23 Furthermore, it appears that a voting machine mechanic
disconnected the marshal's lever on his own decision = 4 prior to the
meeting of commissioners. His superiors were not informed of this
228 This
and D of
candidates
Brief at 8.

229

alternative, considered by officials, would have listed Wyche and Cox on rows C
the ballot, below the other candidates. On the final ballot, 24 Democratic
were listed horizontally on row A and two Republicans on row B. LCDC
Notice would still have been required for the candidates and the public.

LCDC Brief at 7. Robert Hughes, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of

State, preferred this procedure before speaking with Post. LCDC Brief at 8.
procedure considered would have disconnected the marshal's lever only in
precincts that contained both Tallulah and outside voters. Id. In this way, at
voters in the other three precincts could all use the straight party lever to

Another
the four
least the
vote for

marshal. See note 214 supra.
230 LCDC Brief at 8.
231 Id.
232 Two election commissioners, Mary Veal and Emma Weston, claimed Post had
not informed them that each voter had to pull the individual lever to vote for marshal.
Government Brief at 28-34. Post and James Trichel, the voting machine supervisor,
claimed, however, that the proper instructions were given. Government Brief at 27.
Compare the court's opinion:
At the school [for commissioners] it was at least mentioned that the pulling of
the master party levers would not affect the election of the Marshal for the Village of Tallulah, Louisiana. This condition of the machines, however, was not
made clear to the persons in attendance.
297 F. Supp. at 49.
233 See note 219 supra.
234 Government Brief at 17-20.
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fact until after the meeting was held, when Post could argue that a
235
change in procedure would confuse the commissioners.
Even if one assumes the decision to use the lockout resulted from
poor judgment, the defendants' failure to notify the candidates and
voters remains highly suspect. Post in particular realized that Wyche
was basing his campaign on straight ticket voting, but made no effort
to inform him of the basic change in procedure. 236 Nor did the Secretary of State send Wyche a copy of the corrected sample ballot indi2 37
cating the necessity of pulling the individual lever for marshal. Most
curious of all, no local official publicly announced that the marshal's
race would be disconnected.2 38 While commissioners should have explained this fact on election day, public notice would have minimized
confusion. The defendants also failed to place the required demonstration voting machine in Ward 4 prior to the election, 23 9 failed to inform
Wyche of the sealing of the actual machines, 240 and failed to replace
the incorrect written instructions which had been inserted in the machines.241
2. The Role of Compromise in Litigation. Despite the strong evidence of wrongdoing, the Department of Justice 2 2 and LCDC 243 made
a conscious decision not to press the question of intentionality. First,
the attorneys declined to initiate contempt proceedings against Post,
even though he was under an injunction at the time of the election
not to engage in any "practices and procedures which may be discriminatory in fact." 244 Since Judge Dawkins had avoided a finding of
intentionality in Post I, it was assumed that he would not respond
favorably to a request for sanctions directed at specific white officials.
235

Id.

236 Government Brief at 46-47. Post also knew that Wyche had inspected the incorrect
sample ballot on January 19. LCDC Brief at 4.
237 297 F. Supp. at 49-50. Wyche had written to the Secretary of State requesting
copies of the sample ballot for Ward 4. He received them on January 23, but never
received any corrected samples. Id. at 48, 49.
238 Government Brief at 6, 14, 47.
239 LCDC Brief at 17. LA. PEv. STAT. ANN. § 18:1180 (1969) states in part that "at
least one machine for demonstration purposes shall be placed in each ward not more
than twenty five days and up to but not including the day of election." When the
machines were set up on election day, however, they contained erroneous instructions.
240 Mrs. Grimes testified that she mailed notice of the time and place of sealing of
the machines to Wyche in accordance with LA. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1176 (1969). Record
at 239-40. Wyche tesified that he did not receive notice. Id. at 25. Cox, moreover, was
subpoened to produce all documents received from the Clerk's office relating to the
election, and did not produce any such notice. Id. at 147.
241 297 F. Supp. at 49-50.
242 Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.

243 LCDC Interviews, supra note 128.

244 Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60, 64 (W.). La., 1968).
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Second, plaintiffs' attorneys recognized the lower standard of proof
established in Post I and repeatedly emphasized the discriminatory effect of the defendants' action without impugning their motives. 245 The
briefs meticulously documented the various failures of each official,
while carefully withholding any conclusions of intent. Although the

plaintiffs argued the discrimination was harmful precisely because it
was subtle, the analysis did not characterize the subtlety itself as pur-

poseful. 246 The Department of Justice and LCDC thus honored Judge
Dawkins' gradualist approach 24 7 by asking for a new election, their
primary goal, at the expense of seeking sanctions for official misconduct.
The court's decision embodies this compromise approach by finding
discrimination in fact and ordering a new election, while characteriz-

ing the defendants' actions as undertaken in "good faith." 248 Although
the decision provided a remedy for the immediate wrong, failure to
find intentionality cost the plaintiffs additional relief. Officials were
not only spared considerable embarrassment and political repercussions249 but were also protected against possible prosecutions for voting

fraud.

250

245 It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs' briefs mention neither Post's role in
Brown nor the injunction issued against him. In contrast, the injunction was raised by
the State in Post's defense:
Mr. Post was under a restraining order as a result of a previous suit, Brown v.
Post, 279 F. Supp. 60. Now the plaintiffs attack Mr. Post's alleged inactivity
whereas in the above suit his activity was attacked. Plaintiff would apparently
condemn Mr. Post for either his activities or his inactivity.
Brief for Defendant at 13.
246 Repeated efforts to enforce the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment have
made us aware of one indisputable fact; that as the prohibitions [on discrimination in voting] become more effective, the obstacles to Negro political participation become more ingenious. The instant case presents a classic example
in subtle discrimination.
Government Brief at 51.
247 The phrase is that of Charles Hamilton, who has categorized Southern federal
judges as "recalcitrant," "gradualist," and "aggressive." Hamilton, supra note 124.
248 This action by defendant Post [failing to instruct the election commissioners
properly] was not in bad faith. He and all other defendants at all times acted
in good faith, never intending to deprive Negroes of their constitutional or
statutory right to vote. . . . Where, as was done here, public officials, engaged
in performing the duties of their offices, cause to be disseminated instructions
to voters as to the manner of casting votes in a general election and, then, even
though in good faith, without adequate notice to the voters, institute a new
voting procedure contrary to the instructions previously disseminated, and a
substantial number of Negro voters are induced to vote according to such
erroneous instructions and are thereby prevented from casting effective votes,
we conclude that Negroes have been discriminated against in the administration
of the voting process ....
297 F. Supp. at 50, 51.
249 White parish residents have expressed increased dissatisfaction with the necessity of
voting again for the same offices. Interviews with local residents, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 28,
1970.
250 Admittedly, it is not likely that state prosecutions under LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18:369, 18:1194, or 18:221 (1969) would have followed a finding of intentional discrimination since one of Post's attorneys was Thompson Clarke, District Attorney for the
Sixth Judicial District of Louisiana.
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More important, however, the finding of good faith undercut any
deterrent effect the litigation might have on future conduct. First, the
decree did no more than order the defendants to obey the law: "The
defendants... shall administer the voting process in compliance with
the applicable Louisiana and Federal law in such a manner that will
afford equal opportunities to vote to all qualified voters regardless of
race or color." 251 Second, the Judge warned the officials not to repeat
the same mistakes: "Defendants are specifically enjoined from engaging in the practices which were found to be discriminatory in the February 6, 1968, election and any other practices and procedures which
25 2
may be discriminatory in fact."
Finally, the defendants' exculpation reduced the plaintiffs' ability
to improve their position in future lawsuits. Recent voting rights cases
have established that a documented history of purposeful discrimination casts a strong presumption of illegality over continuing attempts
to manipulate the electoral process. 25 By specifically emphasizing Post's
"good faith" efforts on two separate occasions, Judge Dawkins implicitly
declined to recognize that a conscious pattern of discrimination existed
in Madison Parish. In fact, the Judge's decision makes no mention of
Ward or Post I, as though Post 11 were sui generis rather than one instance of a historical continuum.
In sum, Judge Dawkins imposed almost the same injunction in
Post II as in Post 1. In the second case, it is true, the injunction remained in effect, placing some element of deterrence on the principal
defendant. But on the whole, Judge Dawkins did not increase the
threat of sanctions on election officials. On the contrary, he showed
a willingness to give the defendants every benefit of the doubt in their
administration of the electoral process. The chance of punishment for
discrimination-whether by the criminal law, the civil law, or the
contempt power-remained remote.
Arguably, the Judge felt that after three government-supported suits,
local officials would recognize the futility of further denying black citizens the right to participate fully in community politics. 2 5 But sub251 297 F. Supp. at 51.
252 Id. Considering the generality of this injunctive order and Dawkins' refusal to find

intentionality despite the strong evidence, it is unlikely that he would ever punish
discriminatory conduct through contempt. Rather, the entire history of Post I and Post 11
suggests that Dawkins would excuse a defendant who could show the thinnest justification.
253 See, e.g., United States v. Democratic Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 943 (M.D. Ala.
1968); Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966), modified, 386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.
1967); United States v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Ala. 1965); Sims v. Baggett, 247
F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La.
1963), af'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
254 Department of Justice attorneys themselves indicate that one government suit is
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sequent events proved otherwise, as the final resolution of Post 11
indicates. In the new election, held on May 20, 1969, Wyche did in fact
defeat Cox, by a margin of 1,949 to 1,796.255 Nevertheless, Wyche failed
to receive his commission within the usual time. Apparently the thought
of a black police chief still created consternation. On June 7, 1969,
LCDC filed a motion for an injunction requiring the Governor and
the Secretary of State to deliver the commission in question. Eventually the Governor complied, issuing Wyche the necessary document
on June 23. LCDC subsequently withdrew its motion, but Wyche by
this time had received the message. After winning one primary, one
suit, and a second election, he still had to contend with white officials
before he could take office.
C.

25
Toney v. White

In April, 1970, the focus of Madison Parish litigation shifted from
official interference with the process of general elections to a discretionary purge of voters prior to the Democratic primary. The black
community had attempted to gain political control of Tallulah for the
first time by nominating a full slate of eight candidates to run for town
and party offices. 257 Only Johnnie Crockett and Wyche, however, survived opposition in their respective races for the Democratic Executive
Committee and for village marshal. LCDC then filed suit against the
Registrar, alleging the purge of 159 black voters and eleven white voters
to be illegal and discriminatory. 258 The complaint requested that every
election be set aside, except the village marshal's, because Wyche was
the only winning candidate who still faced an opponent in the general
election. 259 One month later, the Department of Justice brought a
similar suit but extended its prayer for relief to invalidation of the
usually "enough" to convince local officials not to interfere with voting rights. Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.
255 Madison Journal (Ia.), June 11, 1970, at 1.
256 Toney v. White, Civil No. 15,641 (W.D. La., filed May 4, 1970).
257 Compare the local reaction to this strategy:
Now I have never heard of anything more ludicrous than a "black ticket." Yet,

that's what we have in Tallulah right now-a black ticket ...

. . How they run for office is their business, except that they have turned the
election into a race issue, which I feel is significant and deserving of the comment
I have given it.
Madison Journal (La.), Mar. 26, 1970, at I (editorial by Carroll Reagan, a prominent
Tallulah citizen).
258 The action was brought on behalf of the six losing candidates, three black voters,
and their class under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a)(2), 1973, and 1983 (Supp. V, 1965-69). Civil No.
15,641 (W.D. La.).
259 The complaint did not actually state this reason, which is mentioned in Post-Trial
Brief for Plaintiff at 2.
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entire April 4 primary. 60 Wyche subsequently secured his post as village marshal by defeating Cox in the general election held on June 9.
Rather than argue the merits of Toney v. White prior to decision,
the following discussion focuses on two problems of relief generated
by the factual situation. First, the voiding remedy is analyzed to determine whether its conceptual underpinnings permit only part of an
election suit to be set aside. Second, the appropriateness of additional
relief is considered in the light of past Madison Parish litigation.
1. The "Selective" Purges. The key factual issue in Toney involves
the Registrar's allegedly illegal and discriminatory application of state
voter eligibility statutes.261 Louisiana law requires registrars to
purge from the rolls any elector who has not voted in the past four
years2 62 and permits removal of individuals believed to be illegally
registered. 26 3 In either instance citizens must be given personal and
published notice of the challenges and be provided an opportunity to
reinstate themselves within a specified period.2 If they fail to seek
reinstatement they may reregister by meeting standard state requirements. 26 5 However, registration books are closed thirty days prior to
any general or primary election, 266 thereby foreclosing the opportunity
for reregistration before the election for failure to meet the reinstate260 United States v. Bishop, Civil No. 15,747 (W.D. La., filed June 8, 1970). Private
and government suits were consolidated for the purposes of trial, held on January 18-19,
1971 after an initial postponement.
261 The selective purge of black voters revives a discredited tactic of the segregationist
era in Louisiana. During 1956-58, the Association of Citizens Councils mapped a two-step
plan to eliminate black voters from the rolls. Blacks would first be purged under the
various challenge statutes, then denied reregistration by rigorous application of the
interpretation test. See 1961 CIvIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 21, at 48-48; 1959 CIvIL
RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 18 at 101-06. An estimated eleven thousand voters were purged
from the voting lists of twelve Louisiana parishes within a few months in 1956 and 1957
alone. U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, THE Fury STATES REPORT 219 (1961). Moreover,
Judge Dawkins himself condemned several massive purges as blatantly discriminatory. See
United States v. Clement, 231 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. La. 1964); United States v. Crawford,
229 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. La. 1964); United States v. Wilder, 222 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. La.
1963); United States v. Association of Citizens Councils, 196 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. La. 1961).
But see United States v. Lucky, 239 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. La. 1965) (evidence not found tc
have supported a finding of discrimination).
262 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:240 (1969).
263 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:132 (1969).
2G4 The registrant is given ten days from the date of the letter, and three days fron
the date of newspaper publication, to appear at the registrar's office. While a registrani
who appears under § 18:240 must be reinstated upon satisfactorily identifying himsell
to the registrar, a person seeking reinstatement pursuant to § 18:132 must present affa.
davits of three bona fide registered voters of the parish that he is legally entitled tc
remain on the rolls.
265 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:135 (1969).
266 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:170 (1969).
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ment deadline.26 7 The timing of purges by Registrar Bishop has been
questioned because she did not mail letters of challenge to 130 blacks
and eleven whites until March 4,268 effectively forcing the persons in
question to appear at her office within ten days or forego voting in the
April 4 primary. 2 9 The newspaper announcement, however, did not
contain the required notice of reinstatement rights.2 7 0 Nor did Mrs.

Bishop keep her office open for more than five of the mandatory ten
days, although she added three days to the reinstatement period with271
out informing affected individuals.
While the above conduct is of questionable legality and affected a
disproportionately high number of black voters, the principal evidence
of discrimination appears from the selective purge of 29 black citizens
for residing at addresses different than those listed on their registration
records.2 72 The Registrar failed to challenge 141 whites who had moved
or changed addresses prior to March 23273 and failed to review the
eligibility, as required, of 62 white voters who had voted by absentee
ballot during the previous two year phase.2 4 Athough it cannot be
estimated how many of these white registrants would have been removed if challenged, it is known that 93 voted in the primary275 and
267 According to the Louisiana Attorney General, no purge under § 18:240 can be made
in good faith if the registrar waits until thirty days before an election. If, however, a
registrant is called to appear within the thirty-day period when the books are closed, he
must be reinstated and allowed to vote in the forthcoming election upon identifying
himself to the registrar's satisfaction. [1956-1958] LA. ATr'Y GEN. R P. & Or. 210-11.
268 Brief for Plaintiff Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee at 3 [hereinafter cited
as LCDC Brief]. This purge was conducted under § 18:240 exactly thirty days before the
April 4 primary, violating the requirements of good faith indicated by the Attorney
General. See note 267 supra.
269 Four persons did appear at the Registrar's office after the ten-day period and were
denied registration for this reason. Brief for Plaintiff United States Department of Justice
at 37 [hereinafter cited as Government Brief].
270 The notice simply indicated the individuals would be removed from the registration
rolls, although § 18:240 states that the publication must inform voters of reinstatement
procedures. Government Brief at 12. This omission was of particular importance to 65
registrants whose letters were returned as undeliverable. The published list provided
them notice of the purge but incorrectly implied they could not be reinstated.
271 Government Brief at 16.
272 Government Brief at 23. According to the Registrar, this purge was conducted
under § 18:132, although she received notice of the registration defects from two white
voters, including a candidate for alderman. LCDC Brief at 8.
273 Government Brief at 28-30.
274 Id.
at 31-32. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1080 (1969) provides that registrars must
cancel an individual's registration if continued absentee balloting is unjustified. The
failure to purge absentee voters might well have been the decisive factor in the primary.
All eight black candidates out-polled their white opponents on the voting machines in
every race; however, absentee ballots provided the winning margins for white candidates
in six races. LCDC Brief at 6.
275 Government Brief at App. B.
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that 97 were stricken from the rolls afterward for failure to justify
continued registration.276 In contrast, only three of the 159 challenged
blacks voted in the primary, although eighty would have been eligible
to do so had the purge not been effected. 277 In short, the plaintiffs
charge Mrs. Bishop with selectively purging black voters, providing
misleading notice, and allowing insufficient reinstatement time, while
neglecting to challenge white voters with equally defective registration.
2. Refining Voiding Relief. If Judge Dawkins makes a finding of
discrimination in these circumstances, he should be prepared to grant
immediate relief which will eliminate the effects of discrimination,
and to impose remedies that will reduce the possibility of another
unfair election. Previous cases suggest that manipulation of the electoral
process will continue unless he increases the the severity of sanctions.
Hence, his first option is to overturn only those elections lost by black
candidates, thereby implementing the voiding remedy without rewarding those who engaged in discrimination. This solution could be
reached by tailoring general equitable principles of voiding elections
to fit the particular circumstances of Madison Parish. In Bell v. Southwell,278 as previously mentioned, the Fifth Circuit authorized setting
aside an election tainted by discrimination regardless of whether the
discrimination affected the outcome. The court based its decision on
the belief that discrimination caused "the body politic as a whole, both
Negro and white," to suffer. 27 9 Voiding relief was therefore ordered
to protect the right of voters to participate in an election conducted
free of impermissible racial distinctions.
If rigidly applied, this doctrine would require overturning every
April 4 primary contest. However, the underlying rationale of Bell
is that voiding relief provides one appropriate means of remedying
discrimination-not that all tainted elections must be overturned. Since
Wyche gained victory despite discrimination against his race, the necessity of setting aside his election disappears. New elections would not
eliminate, but would perpetuate, the harm flowing from the initial dis276 Id. at 30, 35. After the April primary, 72 of the 141 persons were removed
following a challenge made by black voters under LA. R v. STAT. ANN. § 18:133 (1969),

which authorizes third parties to present affidavits to registrars indicating that named
individuals are illegally registered. LCDC Brief at 8-9. The Registrar also removed 25 persons for failure to justify continued absentee voting after the filing of the complaint made
her aware of the applicable provisions. Government Brief at 35.
277 Government Brief at App. B. Assuming no purge had occurred, 79 black voters
removed from the rolls were not eligible to vote in the primary because they resided
outside Tallulah or were members of the States Rights or Republican Parties. Id. The
briefs do not indicate, however, how many black voters were discouraged from seeking
reinstatement because of the deficient notice or limited office hours.
376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967).
279 Id. at 662.
278

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 38:726

crimination. The black incumbent would be forced to campaign again,
even though he had nothing to gain and everything to lose in a second
primary. Wyche would thus be penalized for the Registrar's purge
while his two defeated opponents reaped the benefits of discrimination
by obtaining a second chance to beat the black candidate. 28 0 Cox particularly does not deserve such a "windfall," because he was defeated
by Wyche in an election that no one disputed.
Admittedly, the court cannot presume that Wyche would have won
the primary had no discrimination occurred.28 ' On the other hand,
Judge Dawkins must not blind himself to the reality that a racial power
struggle exists in Madison Parish. 2 2 The dilution of black voting
strength could not conceivably help the black candidate or hurt the
white one. Retaining Wyche's election would therefore recognize the
plain fact that he overcame the discrimination.
A recent Fifth Circuit decision, Thompson v. Brown,28 3 provides a
second reason for preserving Wyche's election. The court held that
two white candidates could not wait until after the general election
to contest the primary victories of their black opponents. 28 4 The critical
error was the failure to file a timely suit seeking to enjoin certification of
the election results. 2 5 The Fifth Circuit therefore found the primary
28o Wyche's position must first be distinguished from that of the six black losers, who
can claim that the purge may have deprived them of victory, and who can therefore
benefit from the new election. See note 274 supra.
A more difficult problem exists in distinguishing the situation of the six white
incumbents who must also face defeat at the polls in new elections. To this extent they
would be punished for the discriminatory acts of other officials who caused the first election to be voided. However, traditional voiding theory has not considered this imposition
too great when weighed against the necessity of redressing discrimination. In the case
of the black incumbent, this is the very question to be asked-whether new elections will
in fact redress the initial discrimination. Moreover, courts have assumed, however
implicitiy, that discrimination against black voters could only benefit white candidates.
New elections, therefore, would strip the white candidate of an impermissible advantage.
281 The court would have to indulge in vote counting, either adding the votes of
the purged black voters or subtracting the votes of the whites who should have been
challenged. Although it is highly likely that each person would vote for the candidates
of his race, this assumption is impermissible. Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir.

1967).

Judge Dawkins in fact made this observation at trial. Record at 79.
283 434 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1970).
284 Bearing in mind the fact that this was merely a contest of a primary, hallenging the right of appellants to appear on the election ballot as candidates, and
that no contest was filed after the election ....
the court asked counsel . . . to
282

show why the primary . . . has not been mooted by the uncontested general

election .... It is plain that the appellants have been serving for more than a
year as aldermen under an election which was not contested. Any question
touching on their qualifications to run in the election has been mooted for the
failure of the appellees or anyone else to challenge the election results.
Id. at 1096 (emphasis in original).
285 The passage quoted in note 284 supra does not clearly indicate whether the
white candidates could have avoided the mootness problem by seeking to void the
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challenge mooted because the aldermen in question had been serving
in office for more than a year after the uncontested general election.
Despite the obverse factual situation, this reasoning applies convincingly to Toney. Since neither the Department of Justice 88 nor Cox
sought to enjoin the general election or prevent certification of its outcome, both should be estopped from challenging Wyche's continued
tenure as marshal. Such an approach would again serve to limit the
adverse effects of the initial discrimination.
3. Increased Judicial Intervention. Previous Madison Parish cases
demonstrate that new elections for losing candidates provide only minimal relief. In the absence of strict judicial enforcement, local officials
persist in using questionable discretionary procedures. Given a history
of electoral misconduct and the necessity for intervention following
a finding of discrimination, the judiciary should be prepared to impose
sanctions with the potential to deter continuing discrimination.
To avoid future resentment and confusion, Judge Dawkins could
insist that election officials regain the voters' confidence by adhering to
higher standards of care than the law requires. Judge Pittman, who
recognized that local practices contributed to racial friction, 287 adopted
this position in Gray v. Main2 8 Although he did not find discrimination requiring relief, the Judge ordered a board of registrars to carry
out its duties under full public scrutiny2 9 and warned officials to improve their conduct:
This law suit probably could have been avoided, and similar
law suits in the future can be avoided, if the defendants and
all officials who occupy similar positions will take pains not
only to observe the legal requirements with reference to racial discrimination, but also to avoid participating in and
creating (and offer leadership to the electorate to avoid) situations which easily and quite naturally arouse suspicion of
290
racial discrimination.
primary after it was held, or whether the critical failure lay in not attempting to enjoin

the general election.
286 The Government filed suit on June 8 to void the whole primary, but did not
seek to enjoin the conduct or certification of the general election, held on June 9. The
distinction may be a technical one, since the Department of Justice took some action
before the general election, in contrast to the white candidates in Thompson.
287 Gray v. Main, 809 F. Supp. 207, 227 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
288 Id.
289 Id.

290 Id. at 226. Judge Pittman's assessment of the historical context offers an instructive
comparison with Madison Parish:
As for the defendants and white population of Bullock County, the transition
from dominant political control of their elected officials to the prospect of sharing
or losing this control to the Negro population, with a great number of those
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Despite repeated violations of electoral integrity, Judge Dawkins has
never specifically indicated to officials their increased responsibility.
Should the Judge recognize the necessity of an additional sanction
but reject imposition of a higher standard of care, he could institute
a reporting system. This procedure would require the defendants to
inform the court and counsel of all contemplated purges and changes
in electoral procedure. 29 1 The importance of such a remedy lies in
making public officials accountable for their conduct in advance, thus
eliminating the last-minute surprises which have characterized past
elections. The reporting device also places the initial burden of justification on the defendants, where it appropriately belongs. Once the
plaintiffs demonstrate irregularities which might taint the election, the
questionable procedure would be scrapped-for example, the purged
voter would be returned to the rolls or the dead elector removed. While
requiring diligent activity by the plaintiffs, such an order would in fact
only formalize efforts currently made to ascertain how local officials
intend to sabotage key election campaigns.
Finally, Judge Dawkins could tighten the language of his injunctions
to establish unambiguous foundations for contempt proceedings. Admittedly, this sanction has been used only in exceptional circumstances
since it depends on judicial willingness to expose local officials to public
obliquy. 292 But contempt can be effective if the court makes explicit
its intention to invoke the power when necessary.
While Judge Dawkins has shunned forceful measures in the past,
he may now have recognized the need for higher standards and additional relief. In fact, a statement made during an interlude at the
Toney trial suggests that he may be considering a procedure which
will increase the defendants' accountability:
The handwriting is on the wall and the entire country has to
start working as a team and start pulling together-black and
white-realizing that we need the best qualified persons of
both races as our leaders, we must eliminate this polarization
registered being illiterate and untrained, was undoubtedly a searing emotional
experience.
The Negroes were haunted by slavery and historical discrimination, and the
white population was haunted by 19th Century Reconstruction politics.
Id. at 224.
291 See id.; Hogue v. Auburtin, 291 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D. Ala. 1968).
292 See In re Herndon, Criminal No. CR 12,421-N (M.D. Ala., Jan. 7, 1971) (criminal
contempt), and Hadnott v. Amos, Civil No. 2757-N (M.D. Ala., Jan. 7, 1971) (civil

contempt), in which a county probate judge was held in contempt of court for failing to
follow an order requiring him to place black candidates' names on an election ballot.
But cf. United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965), in which the Fifth Circuit had
refused to hold former Governor Ross Barnett in contempt of court.
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of the races if this country is to survive. If we don't pull together as a team we're lost.293
IV.

VOTING RIGHTS LITIGATION: AN EVALUATION

The effectiveness of voting rights litigation must be measured in
terms of its immediate objective-securing the right to vote free from
discrimination-and its ultimate goal-insuring black political participation. 294 The foregoing discussion indicates that litigation did achieve
minimal success by providing relief from specific discriminatory procedures, but that the sanctions invoked proved insufficient to deter repeated violations of electoral integrity. Consequently, judicial enforcement of voting rights has not brought direct political gains. 295 White
officials still control the parish by neutralizing the potential voting
strength of the black majority. 296 More important, the present admin293 Madison Journal (La.), Jan. 21, 1971, at 1. This shortened tolerance of subtle
forms of discrimination reflects a gradual change in the Judge's attitude toward racial
hostility. Judge Dawkins, who had enjoined the holding of a 1959 Civil Rights Commission hearing with a curt "It is all part of the game," 1959 CIVI RIGrrs REPORT, supra
note 18, at 100-01 (for the complete story of this affair, see id. at 98-101), had been
characterized as "torn-a segregationist with respect for the law," Hamilton, supra note
124, at 88 (quoting a Department of Justice attorney), and had been severely criticized
by the Fifth Circuit, see Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930, 936-38 (1958). "Schooled" through
reversals, Judge Dawkins now renders opinions which acknowledge violations of plaintiffs' substantive rights. See the discussion of the Concordia Parish school litigation in 2
RACE REI. L. StrvEy, 174-75 (1970-71) (rejecting a school board's plan for sex separation
in the public schools). However, he adheres to the gradualist approach by granting limited
and often inadequate relief.
294 It might be argued that the sole purpose of voting rights litigation is to guarantee
the right to vote. Government attorneys involved in Madison Parish cases have expressed
this view, stating that local leaders must develop their own political organization.
Compare Attorney General Katzenbach's statement, quoted in P. WATrRs & R. CLEGHORN,
supra note 141, at 265-67. Nevertheless, it is clear that blacks cannot exercise political
power unless they can first organize effective votes. See generally H. HoLLowAY, THE
PoLIrrCs OF SourTlE.N NEGROES 68-90 (1969); E. LADD, NEGRO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE
Sourrr 233-318 (1966); D. MATrrrws & J. PROTHRO, NEGROES AND THE NEW SOUTHERN
PoLrIcs 203-235 (1966).
295 Only five black persons presently hold office in Madison Parish-two members of
the school board, one member of the Democratic Executive Committee of Tallulah, the
town marshal, and the town constable. All of these individuals have been elected by
virtue of the black voting strength in Tallulah and none hold parishwide offices. The
Voters League has not extended influence beyond the city limits, principally because
those blacks who live on white-owned plantations face threats of eviction for political
activity. See, e.g., PoLITacA PARTICIPATION, supra note 122, at 117. Self-employed farmers,
moreover, are not easily organized because they are located throughout the parish.
295 Another contributing factor to white electoral success is the difficulty of achieving
full black registration for the reasons stated in note 295 supra. Approximately 1,300
persons or 25% of the black voting-age population remain unregistered despite intensive
registration drives in 1966, 1968, and 1969. In contrast, virtually 100% of the white votingage population is on the rolls, giving whites a numerical superiority in parishwide
registration as of 1970. Figures, based on the 1960 census, available from Voter Education
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istration has ignored black interests; 97 in accelerating school desegregation, 298 securing urban renewal funds, 299 attracting new industry, 0°
and regulating the hours of liquor establishments.30 1
Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to infer that litigation has made
no impact on local politics. Resort to the federal court has provided
blacks with the means to build organizational strength and to pressure
local government. Initially, the private suit of Wyche v. Ward performed the function of solidifying black leadership at a time when no
individual alone could hazard challenging the white power structure.
The plaintiffs' resolve to unify at all cost created a viable nucleus
which stimulated future registration efforts. Additionally, the litigants
who suffered defeat in court gained the experience of confronting
white officials.
United States v. Ward generated a second stage of development, the
formation of a distinct political organization. Black leaders founded
the Madison Parish Voters League&02 to encourage registration 0 3 by
providing the extensive coaching needed to pass the citizenship and
literacy test. Once the Voting Rights Act eliminated these obstacles,
the League began massive registration drives. The utility of establishing a working organization prior to August, 1965 can best be appreProject. Reports filed with the Voter Education Project, moreover, indicate that the
Registrar still manages to discourage registration, not only by conducting periodic purges
but also by dosing the office, opening at irregular hours, and limiting the number of
blacks allowed in at any one time.
297 The only voluntary improvement in the black residential community has been
installation by the police jury of street lamps and paving of dirt roads.
298 See text at notes 319-22 infra.
299 Black residents found it necessary to secure their own source of federal funds to
build a 120-unit public housing project under § 101 of the Housing Act of 1965. The
police jury would not initiate an urban renewal plan designed to eliminate the serious
housing shortage engendered by the prevalence of substandard housing. See 1967 DATA
BOOK, supra note 12, at 154.
300 Members of the Voters League regard the attraction of new industry as an important

means of stemming the flow of black emigration from the parish. See text and notes at notes
9-11 supra. Although the potential work force does not possess special skills, training, or
education in abundance, black leaders point to the qualified success of Charles Evers in
Fayette, Mississippi, indicating that rural areas can offer industry certain advantages.
Whites, however, contend that no business will locate in an area that is politically unstable-that is, where blacks could assume control. Interviews with local residents, in
Tallulah, La., October 26-28, 1970.
301 Bars presently operate on an unrestricted basis. The only police jury response to
demands for control has been an ordinance requiring segregation in such establishments.
Madison Journal (La.), Jan. 28, 1971, at SA.
302 The League's primary financial support comes from local blacks who contribute prior
to election campaigns and at weekly meetings held to sustain enthusiasm for political partidpation and to coordinate all civil rights activities. Additional funding to support eight-week
voter registration drives has been received from the Voter Education Project. The first grant
was made to the Congress on Racial Equality in 1966. Letter from Marvin Wall, Director,
Voter Education Project, to The University of Chicago Law Review, Dec. 31, 1970.
303 See Sanders, supra note 21, at 64.

1971]

Voting Rights

ciated by comparing Madison with East Carroll Parish. One month
after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the Registrar enrolled 1,800
of the 5,181 eligible blacks in Madison Parish;' 04 registration did not
exceed that figure in East Carroll, where federal examinersO 5 were appointed, until February, 1966. The difference, according to Attorney
General Katzenbach, could be explained in terms of the Voters League
308
campaign.
Subsequent voting rights litigation continued to unify the black community. Candidates explained their losses by arguing that no black
had ever received a fair election,3 07 while leaders pointed to the favorable court decisions as proof that the white administration could not
be trusted.3 08 Moreover, the increasing presence of federal observers,30 9
304 While complying, local officials did not process applications with dispatch when

mass registration began:
This was the wonderful part about the people in Madison Parish. They were so
patient standing in line for days, weeks, and months, until finally we had more
people registered on the books in Madison Parish than the whites and were able
in the end of 1965 to enter the political arena.

Wyche Interview, supra note 41. Moreover, the Registrar originally listed some 283 black
voters on the rolls of the State Rights and Republican Parties, thus rendering them
ineligible for at least six months to vote in the Democratic primary, Madison Parish's

most important local election. Field Reports on file at Voter Education Project (copies on
file at The University of Chicago Law Review).
305 In deciding which of these neighboring parishes should initially receive examiners,
the Government probably selected East Carroll rather than Madison because the Fifth

Circuit's decision in United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795, modified, 352 F.2d 329 (5th Cir.
1965), had not issued by August 6, 1965.
306 p. WATrRS & R. CLEGHORN, supra note 141, at 265-67, quoting Attorney General
Katzenbach. Parish blacks appear to agree. Rather than give credit for increased registration to federal presence, residents cite their own organizing efforts as the controlling variable in achieving political participation. Interviews with local residents, in Tallulah, La.,
Oct. 26-28, 1970.
307 Compare Wyche's contention that white officials "rigged" the voting machines in
the February 6, 1968 general election. Sanders, supra note 21, at 59.
308 Note the April 4, 1970 primary campaign in which black candidates pledged to keep
"the voters of Tallulah properly informed of all coming elections and any and all changes
in election procedures." Madison Journal (La.), Mar. 26, 1970, at 4A (advertisement).
309 The cost of sending federal observers to Madison Parish gives some idea of the heavy
expense involved in monitoring elections:
Number of
Date
Election
Observers
Cost
Aug., 1966
Primary
30
$11,500*
Nov., 1966
General Election
20
7,700*
Nov., 1967
Primary
32
12,300*
Dec., 1967
Primary
34
13,000*
Feb., 1968
Municipal Election
23
8,900'
Apr., 1968
Brown-Fulton Special Election
18
6,900*
Aug., 1968
Municipal Election
22
8,000
Nov., 1968
Municipal Election
19
6,275
May, 1969
Wyche-Cox Special Election
20
8,150
Apr., 1970
Primary
18
7,440
June, 1970
Municipal Runoff
18
7,440
Totals
254
$97,605
Estimated.
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attorneys, and agents, 310 who monitored parish elections, gave credence

to both points of view. Post I and II, therefore, strengthened the resolve
to run a black ticket that would gain control of local government. Concurrently, the Voters League assumed the role of a black Democratic
Party, organizing Tallulah by street, block, and precinct. The racial
polarization3 11 and bloc voting3 12 that characterized past elections made
such a strategy advisable.
By providing the Voters League with an effective bargaining instrument, voting rights litigation facilitated the development of black political organization in a second way. The white community realized
that should blacks bring suit to assert their rights, the success of voiding
suits could be repeated in other areas. Local officials, therefore, chose
to compromise on certain issues that did not directly challenge their
political control. The integration of businesses and public accommodations demonstrates this phenomenon. When the Voters League first
attempted to negotiate the hiring of black employees on a fifty-fifty
basis, local merchants refused to cooperate. In response, black leaders
organized an economic boycott of the town which forced seventeen
establishments to close before businessmen capitulated. 313 The boySource: Letter from David F. Williams, Director, Bureau of Management Services,
United States Civil Service Commission, to The University of Chicago Law Reveiw, Dec.

31, 1970.
310 The Federal Bureau of Investigation periodically inspects the Registrar's records and
generally observes parish elections. Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.
311 Editorials in the Madison Journal suggest the underlying bitterness of recent
elections:
The Journal prints many checks for Negro societies, churches and other organizations, and everyone of them must have a check book printed so that three
people can sign the checks. This shows that they cannot trust one another-even
brother and sister church members. If a Negro cannot be trusted with a small
amount of church or society funds, how could he be trusted with thousandseven hundreds of thousands of public money?
When one Negro sees a so called leader driving around in a big car with a cigar
in his mouth, telling others what to do, it is only natural for them to think they
are underdogs and the one doing the ordering is the one who is getting the gravy.
The Negro sooner or later will come to realize that when he needs help or wants
a favor it is to the white man that he will have to appeal.
Madison Journal (La.), Sept. 1, 1967, at 2. Compare a recent editorial which reprinted an
1880 "To Our Colored Voters" policy statement and then warned, under the title "To
Our Colored Voters-1969":
Just as the Madison Journal warned you of 'political tricksters' nearly 90 years
ago, we are today cautioning you against voting for Zelma C. Wyche for marshal
of this community.
Madison Journal (La.), May 15, 1969, at 1.
312 The two most recent elections indicate the extent to which voting follows racial
lines. In the August 15, 1970 Democratic primary for town constable, white candidate
D'Elmer Williamson received 536 votes in all-white Precinct 1 but only twelve votes in
all-black Precinct 5. His opponent Huey Daily received six and 577 votes in the respective precincts. Similarly, Cox recorded 750 and nineteen votes in the two precincts while
Wyche obtained 28 and 685 votes. Madison Journal (La.), Aug. 29, 1970, at 1.
813

See Sanders, supra note 21, at 58.
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cott's effectiveness turned partly on the knowledge that blacks could
rely on the federal government for legal assistance.3 14 Store owners recognized that continued resistance could only bring economic disaster
and a possible law suit as well.
The boycott, in turn, established a pattern of self help in which
litigation plays a supporting role. Rather than wait for local government to act, blacks have built a public housing project,31 5 contracted
for a rural development program,3 16 and lobbied for anti-poverty
funds. 317
It should be noted, however, that the threat of litigation has no effect where the white community sees its political control challenged.
While the voting rights cases illustrate this point, reapportionment
and desegregation suits demonstrate further the difficulty of effecting
meaningful change. Despite general acknowledgment that the configuration of ward boundaries caused extensive dilution of black voting
strength, the local administration refused to reapportion. When black
leaders filed suit,31 8 the police jury and the school board passed resolutions which further diluted the black vote319 and made the election
of a nonwhite candidate virtually impossible. Under the aegis of the
district court, however, the parties have accepted a temporary compromise until 1970 census figures become available in full detail. The
314 Bee see Wyche v. Louisiana, 394 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1967), and Wyche v. Hester, 273
F. Supp. 131 (W.D. La. 1967), rev'd, 431 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1970), arising out of attempts to

integrate a truck stop. In the first case, Wyche was charged with aggravated burglary for
"unauthorized entry" into the premises. The Fifth Circuit ruled that he was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on his petition to remove the state prosecution to federal court,
remanding for a determination whether Wyche's entry was in the exercise of his rights to
enjoy equal access to a place of public accommodation. In the second case, Wyche was
convicted of simple battery, but the court held that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing in a habeas corpus proceeding brought to test the validity of the state conviction.
315 See note 299 supra.
316 Wyche Interview, supra note 25.
317 The Voters League was instrumental in establishing the Delta Community Action
Project, funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, to run social welfare programs.
The project initially had difficulty in attracting sufficient white interest. A Head Start
pre-school program was terminated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
because it did not meet in the white part of town and did not enroll a proportion of
black and white children equal to the racial composition of Madison Parish.
318 Wyche v. Madison Parish Police Jury, Civil No. 14,503 (W.D. La., filed Apr. 7, 1969).
Ward 1, for example, had one police juror and school board member for 348 inhabitants
while Ward 4, where most of the parish's blacks live, had three representatives for 11,754
people. Id. Reapportionment problems are quickly replacing registration denials as the
most litigated area in voting rights discrimination. See 89 U.S.L.W. 8535 (June 8, 1971).
319 Exhibits A, B. The resolutions called for representatives to run on an at-large basis
throughout the parish. Since white voters constitute a majority of the voters registered in
the parish, see note 296, supra, the plan would effectively undercut the black power base
in Tallulah.
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reapportionment case therefore remains unresolved, three years after
its commencement.
Litigation has also proved necessary to implement and structure
school desegregation. Stated simply, the school board has refused to
take any steps toward integration, unless unequivocally required to do
so by court order.320 Despite years of judicial enforcement,3 21 moreover,
integration has progressed gradually, without dismantling of the dual
school system. 322 This situation is not likely to change in the near
future unless blacks gain control of the school board. However, blacks
cannot obtain that position unless reapportionment and fair elections
come first.
Litigation thus provides the essential means of pressuring whites to
compromise on basic issues of voting, reapportionment, and desegregation. While it is clear that blacks have not made dramatic gains this
way, they have nevertheless compelled white officials to effect a minimum degree of change that would not have been undertaken
otherwise. Yet the continued reliance on private and government suits
points to the very weakness of the black position-for litigation is the
32 3
tool of the politically powerless.
Burke Marshall has observed that
[O]nly political power-not court orders or other federal
law-will insure the election of fair men as sheriffs, school
320 Moreover, the school board would not sign a voluntary compliance agreement,
required by the Government for the grant of federal funds, until the district court ordered
integration.
321 The litigation history may be traced as follows: suit filed August 20, 1965; integration order on a freedom-of-choice plan beginning in September, 1968, Williams v. Kimbrough, 12 RACE REL. L. REP. 1899 (W.D. La. 1967); freedom-of-choice plan considered
best available, Conley v. Lake Charles School Bd., 293 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. La. 1968); reversed on statistical showing that freedom-of-choice did not offer prospects for effectuating
transfer to a unitary school system, 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1969); on remand, new desegregation plans required of school board, 303 F. Supp. 394 (W.D. La. 1969); Fifth Circuit
set aside three-step zoning procedure ending in 1971-72, accepted by the district court,
and ordered immediate adoption of effective unitary school plan, Williams v. Kimbrough,
421 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Williams v. Kimbrough, 295 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. La.
1969), aff'd, 415 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 US. 1061 (1970) (wrongful dismissal of four non-tenured black teachers prior to court-ordered faculty integration).
322 As of January 1, 1970, only 183 black students had entered formerly all-white schools
under the freedom-of-choice plan. Madison Journal (La.), Oct. 18, 1970, at 1. After the
February 1, 1970 court order implemented a zoning scheme, 764 white students and
eighteen teachers left the school system. A private school, Tallulah Academy, was
formed to accommodate this exodus of pupils. By September, 1970, however, more than
three hundred white students returned, bringing the total white enrollment to 20%.
Nevertheless, the majority of black students still attended all-black schools while white
students predominate at formerly all-white institutions. Id.
323 See Matthews, Political Science Research on Race Relations, in 1. KATz & P. GuamN,
RACE AND SocIAL ScEENCEs 113, 118 (1969).
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board members, police chiefs, mayors, county commissioners,
and state officials. It is they who control the institutions which
324
grant or deny federally guaranteed rights.
Madison Parish's experience supports Marshall's conclusion with bitter
irony.325 Three successful lawsuits have not brought fair elections. But
in the absence of fair elections, blacks cannot use their votes to gain
political power or to force recognition of black interests. Hence they
have no choice but to continue litigation.
The Voting Rights Act did not eradicate the need for litigation. It
was not intended to. Rather, this legislation was designed as the water.
shed between denial of the right to vote and participation in the electoral process. Registration is an accomplished fact. But the Act's potential has been lessened by reluctance to use enforcement provisions
and to invoke available judicial remedies. Arguably, it is still too early
to evaluate the impact of the Voting Rights Act by examining the
effects of litigation in Madison Parish. The dark realities of the past
continue to haunt the present. To paraphrase Judge Wisdom, even
though the stranglehold of racial discrimination may be broken, the
326
paralyzing effects remain.

324 B. MARSHALL, FEDMEALISN, AND Cvit RIGHTS 12 (1964).
325 Indeed, in light of the Madison Parish experience it must be asked: Is the only
affirmative obligation protection against discrimination at the threshold of the electoral
process, or does the fifteenth amendment include a duty to insure that deprivation of the
right to vote does not continue once individuals are in a position to influence political
life? The corollary to that question is, of course: Who must accept the responsibility for
protecting participation in the political process-the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, or the people themselves?
326 Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party v. Democratic Party, 362 F.2d 60, 63 (5th

Cir. 1966).

